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ABORIGINAL FORESTRY:
COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT AS
OPPORTUNITY AND IMPERATIVE©
By

DEBORAH CURRAN* AND MICHAEL M'GONIGLE**

In recognition that forests are one of their greatest
resources, Aboriginal peoples are considering how
altered tenure arrangements might uphold traditional
values, including ecological integrity, while providing
economic and employment opportunities. However, the
federal and provincial forest management structures
have historically precluded First Nations from helping
to define, and participate in, the forest industry. The
authors explore the legal and regulatory basis of forest
management in Canada, and assess how it facilitates or
impedes Aboriginal management of traditional areas.
This is done through a legislative and policy analysis,
and through the use of case studies from across
Canada. The authors propose an approach to tenure
reform that will allow First Nations to achieve
ecosystem-based community forestry through the use of
traditional governance structures.

Reconnaissant que les forats comptent parmi leurs plus
importantes ressources naturelles, les peuples
autochtones consid6rent comment de nouveaux
arrangements de tenure pourraient maintenir les
valeurs traditionnelles, y inclus l'int6grit6 6cologique,
tout en fournissant des occasions 6conomiques et des
possibilit6s d'emploi. Toutefois les structures
administratives en gestion foresti~re du gouvernement
fdd6dral et des gouvernements provinciaux ont
historiquement emp~ch6 les peuples autochtones
d'assister a d6finir et de participer A l'industrie
foresti~re. Les auteurs examinent les fondements
juridiques et r6glementaires de la gestion foresti~re au
Canada et dvaluent comment ces fondements facilitent
ou entravent ]a gestion des lieux traditionnels par les
autochtones. Ceci est accompli AI'aide d'une analyse
des politiques et des lois, ainsi qu'une 6tude de cas
canadiens. Les auteurs sugg~rent une approche a la
r6forme du concept de la tenure qui permettrait aux
peuples autochtones de r6aliser une exploitation
communautaire de la forat centr6e A la fois sur
1'6cosyst~me et sur des structures gouvernementales
traditionnelles.

I. INTRODUCTION: INTEGRATING TRADITIONAL
VALUES WITH FOREST MANAGEMENT .....................................

712

© 1999, D. Curran & M. M'Gonigle.
* Deborah Curran holds degrees in environmental studies and law, and is the Research
Manager for the Eco-Research Chair of Environmental Law and Policy, University of Victoria.
** Michael M'Gonigle is Eco-Research Professor of Environmental Law and Policy,
University of Victoria.
The authors would like to thank Bradley Bryan and Jennifer Bonnell for their assistance, and
Gil Yaron who conducted extensive research for revisions to the original article, especially in the
area of American tribal forestry. Special thanks go to Hamar Foster, Ross McMillan, Robert
Michel, Richard Overstall, and Peggy Smith, who provided comments for revisions to this article.
Finally, the Eco-Research Chair is funded by the Tri-Council Secretariat. We would like to thank
the Secretariat for its ongoing support.

712

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

37 NO. 4

[VOL.

II. ABORIGINAL RIGHTS AND FORESTRY: PROCEDURAL
RIGHTS ON TRADITIONAL LANDS ..........................................
A. CanadianContext ..........................................................
1. Legal definition of Aboriginal Rights ........................................
a) Legislationand treatyrights ...............................................
b) Jurisprudenceon AboriginalRights and
Aboriginal Title, Pre-Delgamuukw .........................................
c) Delgamuukw v. British Columbia-AboriginalTitle ...........................

717
717
717
717
719
723

2. Legislative reform ........................................................

729

3. Policies and programs .....................................................

732

a) Federalandprovincial ...................................................

732

b) FirstNations ..........................................................

734

4. Treaty negotiations .......................................................

736

B. American Context ...........................................................

738

III. ABORIGINAL FORESTRY UNDER GOVERNMENT
TENURES: FORESTS AS TIMBER PRODUCTION .............................

745

A. Contracts .................................................................

746

B. Joint Ventures ..............................................................

747

C. Crown Tenures .............................................................

749

D. Model Forests ..............................................................

752

IV. COMMUNITY CONTROLLED FORESTS: THE
ELUSIVE VALUATION OF TRADITION ......................................

753

A. Co-managementof TraditionalLands ..........................................
B. Reserve Land ..............................................................

753
761

C. Treaties ...................................................................

766

V. CONCLUSION: COMMUNITY ECOSYSTEM-BASED MANAGEMENT ...........

773

I. INTRODUCTION: INTEGRATING TRADITIONAL
VALUES WITH FOREST MANAGEMENT

In the fall of 1999, four bands of the Okanagan Nation began
logging on Crown land without permits. The first of these Aboriginal
communities was the Westbank First Nation, which had been
unsuccessful in negotiating a cutting permit with the Ministry of Forests.
The Westbank claim Aboriginal title in the area where the trees were
cut, and are challenging Crown authority to manage resources on that
land. The bands are not willing to wait for the outcome of the treaty
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process in British Columbia as it slowly moves towards resolution of
Aboriginal land claims.1 The action of the Okanagan bands is indicative
of the growing dissatisfaction of Aboriginal communities with the use of
their traditional territories, especially for logging. From the Westbank
and other First Nations in British Columbia, to the Micmac in New
Brunswick-who have undertaken similar high-profile actions in the
past-Aboriginal peoples across Canada are challenging provincial
management of forest resources on the basis that they infringe upon
their Aboriginal rights, particularly as defined in recent court decisions.
And they are asserting their "right" to manage, and profit from, these
resources themselves.
Aboriginal peoples in Canada have long depended on the forest
environment. Of the 603 First Nations in Canada, 80 per cent inhabit
productive forest areas, and more than one-third have over 1,000
hectares of forest within their reserve lands.2 Not surprisingly, one of the
most important issues for Aboriginal peoples in Canada is the form of
control-or tenure-over these traditional lands. This article explores
the nature of Aboriginal tenure over forest resources, and considers
what form might best reflect the particular needs and values of diverse
First Nations while, at the same time, ensuring long-term ecosystem
protection. This analysis is especially important in British Columbia,
where treaty negotiations offer a unique possibility of developing novel
landholding arrangements.
For some Aboriginal peoples, management control of traditional
territories is oriented towards enhanced economic benefits. Others
advocate community control because of a concern about ecosystem
degradation caused by destructive industrial logging practices, the loss of
traditional values, and the consequent need for more holistic forest
management. In any case, the future of Aboriginal peoples is still very
much tied to the physical environment. Forests are used for timber
products such as lumber and firewood, and also for hunting, medicines,
and spiritual and cultural needs. Despite variations in priorities,
Aboriginal peoples share a common desire for control over their forest
resources, a common goal that conflicts with existing forestry tenure

I See, for example, R. Mickleburgh, "Stakes are Raised in B.C. Native Logging Dispute" The
Globe and Mail (1 October 1999) A6; C. Gillis, "Judge Refuses to Force B.C. Natives to Halt
Logging" The NationalPost (28 September 1999) A6; and C. Morris, "N.B. Natives Lose Logging
Appeal" CanadianPress Newswire (22 April 1998).
2 See National Aboriginal Forestry Association,A Proposalto First Nations (Ottawa: National

Aboriginal Forestry Association, 1994) at I [hereinafter NAFA Proposal].
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systems3 As the National Aboriginal Forestry Association

(NAFA)

asserts:
[M]ost Aboriginal communities remain frustrated in their efforts to regain productive use

of lands and waters beyond the boundaries of those lands set aside for them as reserves
or communities; nor, for the most part, have they succeeded in gaining a meaningful
influence on decisions affecting the management of lands and waters in the vicinity of
their reserves, or territories they have used for generations. For the majority of
Aboriginal communities within Canada, the recognition of an inherent right of selfgovernment will, by itself, fail to meet aspirations .... Improved access to land and
4
resources will be essential.

Recognizing that forests are (with fish) one of their greatest
resources, Aboriginal peoples are beginning to consider how new tenure
systems might be developed that would uphold traditional values while
providing economic and employment opportunities. While there is no
single Aboriginal point of view, 5 many Aboriginal peoples advocate an
approach to forestry that integrates traditional values with economic
development. 6 Given the historic lack of access to forests on traditional
lands outside reserves, and the common misuse of reserve forests, the
issue remains whether Aboriginal peoples will be successful in creating

3 Forestry tenures capture Crown land for the single use of timber production. Other activities
cannot conflict with that use and are, indeed, usually precluded because of the tree cutting.
Traditional Aboriginal conceptions of forest use, or "tenure" without ownership, accommodated
diverse forest uses and users. This fundamental division in Crown and Aboriginal understandings of
land use not only challenges the industrial forestry complex, but is also a major barrier to Aboriginal
access to traditional lands.
4 National Aboriginal Forestry Association, Forest Lands and ResourcesforAboriginalPeople:
An Intervention Submitted to the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (Ottawa: National
Aboriginal Forestry Association, 1993) at 1 [hereinafter NAFA Submission].
5 Perhaps the closest to a unified Aboriginal point of view in written form is the Report of the
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples and accompanying recommendations, given the broad
support it has received from Aboriginal peoples across Canada: see Canada, Royal Commission on
Aboriginal Peoples, Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples: Restructuring the
Relationship,vol. 2 (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 1996) (Co-chairs: R. Dussault & G.
Erasmus) at 631-43 [hereinafter Restructuringthe Relationship],discussed in Part IlI, below.
6 See National Aboriginal Forestry Association, Summary of FirstNations' Workshops on Forest
Management Programming(Ottawa: National Aboriginal Forestry Association, 1994) at 10-11
[hereinafter NAFA Summary], where such an approach is described:
First Nations strive to achieve holistic integrated resource management .... This
approach recognizes the importance of being aware of and strengthening the linkages
between the forest health, wildlife, and fisheries. This approach respects basic forest
management principles, while focusing on the maintenance of sustainable forests and
enhancing non-timber forest values and uses. As well, for some First Nations this
approach includes community participation in the management process and inspires a
sense of community ownership of the First Nations' forest management goals and
objectives.
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an ecologically-sensitive and economically-beneficial form of
management around the globe. Historic examples of poor resource
management by First Nations exist: the hunting to extinction of the Moa
bird of New Zealand, the decimation of Easter Island by the
Polynesians, and the participation by the Algonquins in the fur trade. In
Canada and British Columbia, however, the broad decline in fishery and
forestry health is not related to Aboriginal activities, but to industrial
development by non-Aboriginal society.
In this regard, traditional values and ways of governance could
be undermined by the imposition of non-Aboriginal governance
structures on Aboriginal peoples. Indeed, non-Aboriginal advisors and
First Nations members who embrace mainstream economic
development often control the band corporations that undertake forest
activities. 7 If traditional and contemporary values are to mesh, careful
and critical attention to the structure and design of Aboriginal
institutions-including landholding-is essential. This situation is critical
to the larger challenge of sustainability, and necessitates management
structures that are both culturally and ecologically prescribed:
The exercise of management rights ... is most likely to succeed where they are embedded
in the experience of the place. The trend of centralization has historically run counter to

this natural law, from the erosion of native folkways to the demise of the self-reliant rural
farming community. The crisis of sustainability which we face today flows from
this-where rights are separated from responsibilities, serious problems result. Absentee

ownership and centralist mismanagement of the environment go hand-in-hand.
Ultimately, the native title claim finds its justification in this naturalist perspective-in

the social and ecological values which have traditionally been constitutive of native
culture. 8

This article explores the historical legal influences that have
created the present situation for Aboriginal peoples, and evaluates
Aboriginal initiatives in the forestry sector that might blend traditional
values and timber extraction into some form of sustainable forestry. At
the foundation of this discussion are the legal regimes that shape
Aboriginal rights and forest tenures. To situate this analysis of
Aboriginal tenure within sustainable forestry, an approach known as
"ecosystem-based management" is used. In recent years, the broad

7 The problem of unresponsive band leadership is also often cast in gender terms, associated
especially with the disenfranchisement of Aboriginal women whose values are oriented less to

development, and more to community maintenance: see, for example, J. Green "Constitutionalizing
the Patriarchy: Aboriginal Women and Aboriginal Government" (1993) 4 Const. Forum 110 at 111.

8 M. M'Gonigle, "Developing Sustainability: A Native-Environmentalist Prescription for
Third-Level Government" (1989-1990) 84 B.C. Studies 65 at 82-83 [hereinafter "Developing

Sustainability"].
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concern for sustainability has given rise to ecosystem-based
management, where maintaining ecosystem health is taken as the
foundation and context for other activities. This approach is quite the
reverse of the traditional industrial strategy, which only considers
environmental values, if at all, after the fact of economic development. 9

Ecosystem-based management is compatible with traditional,
territorially-based Aboriginal societies, and its practices mirror the sui
generis principles of Aboriginal title10 With new values and structures,
ecosystem-based management could ensure that all members of the

communities benefit equitably from forest development. This is one of
the promises that is inherent in the treaty process in British Columbia.
As we shall see, however, in light of the Nisga'a FinalAgreement signed

in August 1998,11 it is a promise that could well be lost.

9 For further discussion, see R.E. Grumbine, "What is Ecosystem Management?" (1994) 8"
Conservation Biology 27; and S.D. Slocombe, "Implementing Ecosystem-Based Management"
(1993) 43 Bioscience 618. One of the first steps in implementing this approach is defining the
productive capabilities of the ecosystem. An application of this approach is the work of the
Scientific Panel for Sustainable Forest Practices in Clayoquot Sound. The Panel was charged with
reviewing current forest practices standards in Clayoquot Sound and recommending changes. The
primary planning objective of the Panel was to sustain the productivity and natural diversity of the
Clayoquot Sound region and the stability of local communities. The central goal was to change the
management objective from that of maintaining an economically determined cut level to that of
maintaining the whole forest ecosystem, and withdrawing only that amount of timber consistent
with the maintenance of ecosystem integrity: see Scientific Panel for Sustainable Forest Practices in
Clayoquot Sound, Sustainable Ecosystem Management in Clayoquot Sound: Planning and Practices,
Rep. No. 5 (Victoria: Scientific Panel for Sustainable Forest Practices in Clayoquot Sound, 1995).
10 See, for example, Scientific Panel for Sustainable Forest Practices in Clayoquot Sound, First
Nations Perspectives: Relatingto ForestPracticesStandardsin Clayoquot Sound, Rep. No. 3 (Victoria:
Scientific Panel for Sustainable Forest Practices in Clayoquot Sound, 1995). The Panel documents
the extensive traditional knowledge of the Nuu-Chah-Nulth Nations of Clayoquot Sound, and
compares how Aboriginal knowledge and interests are addressed in current forest planning. It
recommends new forest practices that address Aboriginal historical, cultural, and spiritual interests
in the ecosystem.
11 See British Columbia, Nisga'a Nation & Government of Canada, Nisga'a FinalAgreement
(Victoria: Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs, 1998) [hereinafter Nisga'a Agreement], online: Nisga'a
Final Agreement <http:llwww.aaf.gov.bc.ca/aaf/treaty/nisgaa/docs/nisgaagreement.html> (date
accessed: 14 June 2000). The agreement is now in force: see Nisga'a FinalAgreementAct, S.B.C.
1999, c. 2 [hereinafter Nisga"a FinalAgreement Act (B.C.); and Nisga'a FinalAgreement Act, S.C.
2000, c. 7 [hereinafter Nisga'a FinalAgreement Act (Can.)].
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II. ABORIGINAL RIGHTS AND FORESTRY: PROCEDURAL
RIGHTS ON TRADITIONAL LANDS
A. CanadianContext
1. Legal definition of Aboriginal rights
a) Legislationand treaty rights
Section 91(24) of the Canadian ConstitutionAct, 1867 assigns
jurisdiction for "Indians and lands reserved for Indians" to the federal
government.12 Conversely, forest management comes under provincial
regulation. This division of legislative powers has historically created a
complex management structure whereby both federal and provincial
legislation dictates how Aboriginal peoples may use traditional lands.
First Nations' rights are further divided into Aboriginal and treaty rights.
In Ontario, the Prairie provinces, and the Maritimes, Aboriginal peoples
entered into treaties around the time of first contact with Europeans,
and set out the mutual rights and obligations of the government and
Aboriginal peoples. Historically, treaties, as interpreted by the Crown
and courts, have not specifically addressed the management of the
traditional lands of a First Nation. First Nations obtained reserves on
which to live, and the right to carry out traditional activities, such as
hunting and trapping, on a wider land base. There was no broader right
to control activities on traditional lands. Aboriginal peoples in the
Maritime provinces, Quebec, British Columbia, and the Yukon did not
sign land cession treaties, and traditional Aboriginal rights, specifically
as they relate to land, have only begun to be defined in the past twenty
years.13

12 (U.K.), 39 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5 [hereinafter Constitution
Act, 1867]. It is important to note that the scope of the phrase "lands reserved for Indians" is
broader than simply those lands set aside as Indian reserves, and includes all traditional lands: see
Delgamnuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 at 1119 [hereinafter Delgamuukw]; and H.
Foster, "Roadblocks and Legal History, Part 1I:
Aboriginal Title and s. 91(24)" (1996) 54 Advocate

531.
13 British Columbia, Treaty 8 (1899) affects the northeast part of the province, and the
Douglas Treaties (1850-1854) affect southern Vancouver Island, Nanaimo, and Port Hardy.
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The Indian Act 14 is an exercise of federal legislative authority

over "Indians and lands reserved for Indians."1 5 The Indian Act
regulates Indian status and band government. Provincial laws apply to
Indians and lands reserved for Indians if the law relates to a matter that
falls within provincial jurisdiction, such as labour relations.16 Provincial
laws cannot single out Indians or affect the integral part of federal
jurisdictions over Indians. However, section 88 of the IndianAct enables
provincial laws of general application to apply to, and in respect of,
Indians, including those laws that impair the status or capacity of
Indians, subject to treaty provisions and other federal legislation.) 7 This
legislative scheme makes status Indians subject to provincial Crown
resource management regimes, such as those for forestry.
In this context, the Indian Act contains a single provision that
governs forestry on surrendered or reserve lands. Section 57 reads:
The Governor in Council may make regulations
(a) authorizing the Minister to grant licences to cut timber on surrendered lands, or,
with the consent of the council of the band, on reserve lands;
(b) imposing terms, conditions and restrictions with respect to the exercise of rights
conferred by licences granted under paragraph (a).

This provision provides only for cutting timber, and makes no mention
of planning, reforestation, or the preservation of any ecosystem values.
Similarly, the Indian Timber Regulationsl8 (ITRs) authorized by section 57
merely govern logging. 19

14 R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-5.
15 See ConstitutionAct, 1867, supranote 12, s. 91(24).

16 See P.W. Hogg, ConstitutionalLaw of Canada,vol. 1,looseleaf (Toronto: Carswell, 1992) at
c. 27.2(a).
17
18

1bid. See also Dick v. R., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 309.
C.R.C., c. 961.

19 See J. Mactavish, Review of Indian ForestResource Managementand Development (Ottawa:

Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 1987) at 41. In practical terms, this
system is inoperative in most parts of Canada; east of Saskatchewan, permits are not issued. As a
result, most logging on reserve land is unregulated: see interview with P. Smith, Registered
Professional Forester, NAFA (11 April 1997).
In British Columbia, the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND)
regional staff have been more proactive with the ITrs by developing detailed permits that apply to
band members responsible for all phases of the logging operation and to band members working
with a purchaser-partner to complete the operation. Although the British Columbia permit
requirements are more rigorous than the general standards set out in the ITRs, they fall short of the
standards of ecosystem-based management.
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b) Jurisprudenceon AboriginalRights and
Aboriginal Title, Pre-Delgamuukw
While the Indian Act and regulations, applying only to reserve
lands, make no allowance for forest management, other sources of
law-beginning with the landmark 1973 decision, Calder v. British
Columbia (A.G.)20-have begun to extend the government's general
duties to Aboriginal peoples and to recognize traditional Aboriginal
rights off-reserve. In Calder, the Supreme Court of Canada agreed that
the Nisga'a Nation's historical occupation of traditional lands gave rise
to Aboriginal title as a legal right, so long as it had not been extinguished
by valid legislation. Nine years later, existing Aboriginal and treaty rights
were protected under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982,21
effectively ensuring that these rights prevail over provincial and federal
laws, subject to restrictions. One such restriction occurs if the
government is pursuing a compelling objective (such as conservation) in
a manner consistent with the honour of the Crown. Thus, if their actions
demonstrate respect for the constitutional rights of Aboriginal peoples,
provincial governments have the authority to restrict Aboriginal trapping
and hunting when wildlife populations are deemed too low, or to order
tree cutting if there is a harmful insect or disease present.2 2
In light of section 35, a number of cases decided in the 1990s
began to establish the parameters of Aboriginal rights. In a 1990
decision, R. v. Sparrow,2 3 the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that
federal fishing regulations infringed on the Musqueam First Nation's
Aboriginal right to fish at the mouth of the Fraser River. In 1996, the
Supreme Court of Canada ruled against both a general recognition of
commercial Aboriginal rights 24 (to date, only one case recognizes a
commercial Aboriginal right 25 ) and the ability to manage resources or
20 [1973] S.C.R. 313 [hereinafter Calder].
21 Being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter ConstitutionAct,
1982].
22 See R. v. Agawa (1988), 65 O.R. (2d) 505 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused (1990),
118 N.R. 399n.
23 [19901 1 S.C.R. 1075 [hereinafter Sparrow].
24 See R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507; and R. v.N.T.C. Smokehouse Ltd., [1996] 2

S.C.R. 672.
25 See R. v. Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723 [hereinafter Gladstone], where the Supreme Court
of Canada held that the exchange of herring spawn on kelp for money or other goods was, to an
extent, a central feature of the Heiltsuk culture prior to contact, and therefore an Aboriginal right
to trade herring spawn on kelp on a commercial basis was established.
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control non-Indian uses. 26 The 1996 rulings suggested that First Nations
did not have an Aboriginal right to control or manage forest resources
on traditional lands. However, if a First Nation could establish an
Aboriginal right to use a specific forest resource in their traditional
territory, that Aboriginal right had priority, and other users had to avoid
infringing that right. 2 7
It was in this context that several First Nations initiated actions
dealing specifically with logging activities on traditional lands and the
degree of consultation between the Crown and First Nations regarding
resource activities. For example, in Ryan v. Blitish Columbia (Ministerof
Forests, District Manager)28 a cutting permit was issued under a Forest
Licence to log 197 hectares of timber with a pine bark beetle infestation.
The Gitxsan applied for an injunction to prevent logging and an order
declaring the permit to be invalid on the ground that they had not been
consulted. The court refused to award the injunction or quash the
permit. The court held that the area was outside the traditional territory
claimed in the Delgamuukw case and, while there was a fiduciary duty to
consult, the Gitxsan had been adequately consulted. 29 Likewise, in West
FraserMills Ltd. v. Toosey Indian Band,30 the court also refused to award
the band an injunction against a cutting permit to selectively log trees
that were infested by Douglas fir bark beetle. Although the permit area
was clearly within the traditional territory of the band, the court held
that the public interest should be seriously considered because the

26 See R. v. Nikal, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 1013.

27 An Aboriginal right arises through historic use. For example, hunting, fishing, or using a
specific area for a spiritual ceremony may all create Aboriginal rights.
28 [1994] B.C.J. No. 2642 (B.C. S.C.), online: QL (BCJ). The petitioners appealed and sought
a stay of the operation of the permit pending the outcome of the appeal. The application for a stay
was dismissed: see Ryan v. British Cohnbia (Ministry of Forests, District Manager) (1994), 40
B.C.A.C. 91.

29 The Gitxsan refused to consult with the ministry until the parties had entered into a comanagement agreement respecting Gitxsan traditional lands, and the ministry had promised not to
issue permits without Gitxsan consent. The court held that correspondence with the First Nation
and the many attempts to set up a meeting constituted adequate consultation. Aboriginal peoples

cannot veto ministry decisions, nor can they refuse to engage in consultation when there is a
management or public concern, such as a beetle infestation. The right to consultation is simply a

procedural right. The court hinted that if the permit had been within traditional Gitxsan territory,
and if there were potential harm to fish resources, the injunction might have been allowed.
30 [19941 B.C.J. No. 507 (B.C. S.C.), online: QL (BCJ). West Fraser Mills also sought an
injunction preventing the band from interfering with logging operations. The court refused to grant

the injunction because of the inadequate consultation with the band, and confusion over the terms
of the permits. The judge was critical of consultation materials sent to the band that were overly
technical, disorganized, and difficult to understand.
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purpose of the logging was conservation. The court noted that if the
permit had authorized logging of the whole area, a strong case could
have been made for an injunction. Finally, in Halfway River FirstNation
v. British Columbia (Ministry of Forests),31 the First Nation challenged
the validity of a cutting permit issued for an area immediately adjacent
to its reserve on the basis that it infringed upon their hunting rights
under Treaty 8. The British Columbia Court of Appeal found that the
cutting permit did infringe upon the band's treaty rights, and that the
infringement was not justified because the ministry did not fulfil its
positive duty to consult. This duty included providing "in a timely way
information the aboriginal group would need in order to inform itself on
the effects of the proposed action" and ensuring that "the aboriginal
group had an opportunity to express their interests and concerns." 3 2 The
appeal from the order quashing the permit was dismissed.
After the Supreme Court of Canada's 1997 ruling in
Delgamuukw3 3 articulated a strong definition of Aboriginal title,
discussed below, lower court rulings have gone beyond procedural rights
and challenged Crown authority over forested lands. In R. v. Peter
Paul,34 the lower courts in New Brunswick upheld an Aboriginal right to
cut timber on Crown lands. Four First Nation members were charged
under the Crown Lands and Forests Act 3S with cutting and removing
timber from Crown land. The lower courts ruled that the Act did not
apply to the Micmac of New Brunswick because they have the right to
harvest and sell products derived from natural resources as a right

31 (1999), 178 D.L.R. (4th) 666 (B.C. C.A.).
32 Ibid. at 718. The court held, at 717-18, that
[t]he Crown's duty to consult imposes on it a positive obligation to reasonably ensure that
aboriginal peoples are provided with all necessary information in a timely way so that
they have an opportunity to express their interests and concerns, and to ensure that their
representations are seriously considered and, wherever possible, demonstrably integrated
into the proposed plan of action. ... There is a reciprocal duty on aboriginal peoples to
express their interests and concerns once they have had an opportunity to consider the
information provided by the Crown, and to consult in good faith by whatever means are
available to them. They cannot frustrate the consultation process by refusing to meet or
participate, or by imposing unreasonable conditions.
33

Supra note 12.

"

34 (1996), 182 N.B.R. (2d) 270 (Prov. Ct.), aff'd (sub nom. R. v. Paul(T.P.)) (1997), 193 N.B.R.
(2d) 321 (Q.B. T.D.) [hereinafter Paul (Q.B.)], rev'd (1998), 196 N.B.R. (2d) 292 (C.A.) [hereinafter
Paul (C.A.)], leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused (1998), 204 N.B.R. (2d) 400n.
35 S.N.B. 1980, c. C-38.1.
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defined by treaty 3 6 However, in an appeal with five intervenors, and
with dozens of Aboriginal people cutting trees in Crown forests all over
the province, the Court of Appeal noted that the case, initially argued on
the basis of a treaty right to trade, had been transformed into one
dealing with Aboriginal title.37 The court allowed the appeal, and, citing
evidentiary deficiencies, took care to rule that no claims to Aboriginal
title, treaty, or Aboriginal rights had been made out.38
Another case, Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of
Forests),39 has a more profound effect on Crown tenure. The Haida
Nation challenged a decision of the Ministry of Forests to renew tree
farm licence (TFL) 39, which applies to much of Haida Gwaii, the
traditional territory of the Haida Nation, and the land to which the
Haida Nation claims Aboriginal title.40 The enabling forestry legislation
describes a TEL as an area composed of Crown land that is not otherwise
encumbered; the issue was whether or not Aboriginal title constitutes an
encumbrance. Considered as a preliminary issue of law, the Court of
Appeal allowed the appeal and ruled that Aboriginal title, if it exists,
would be an encumbrance on Crown title. The Court of Appeal also
noted, in obiter, that cases such as St. Catherine'sMilling and Lumber Co.

36 The New Brunswick Provincial Court found that both Mascarene's Treaty of 1726 and the
Treaty of the Peace with the Eastern Micmac Tribes of 1752 clearly set out a commercial right
regarding natural resources that supersedes provincial legislation to the contrary. The Court of
Queen's Bench in Paul (Q.B.),supra note 34 at 336, found that "Indians in New Brunswick can
harvest any and all trees they wish on Crown lands as an appurtenance of their land rights under
Dummer's Treaty," and not as a right of trade.
37

See Paul(C.A.), supranote 34 at 300: "[T]his matter has evolved from an alleged regu)atory
a land claim to the entire Province by the status Indians of New Brunswick."
violation at trial to ...
38 The New Brunswick Court of Appeal ruled, ibid., that Judge Turnbull of the Court of
Queen's Bench had erred in relying on his own historical research to which he had not given the
parties the opportunity to respond.
39 (1997), B.C.L.R. (3d) 80 (C.A.) [hereinafter HaidaNation], leave to appeal to the S.C.C.
refused [1998] S.C.C.A. No. 1, online: QL (SCCA).
40 The Supreme Court of Canada has recognized Aboriginal title as an Aboriginal right that is
protected by section 35(1) of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, supra note 21. In R. v.Adams, [1996] 3
S.C.R. 101 at 117-18, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized Aboriginal title as distinct from
Aboriginal rights because it arises where the relationship between First Nations and their land "was
of central significance to their distinctive culture." The Court described a spectrum of Aboriginal
rights defined by their degree of connection with the land. At one end lie practices, customs, and
traditions that are integral to a distinctive Aboriginal culture, but which are not sufficiently tied to
the occupation and use of the land to equal Aboriginal title. In the middle lie Aboriginal rights that
are site-specific. At the other end lies Aboriginal title that confers a right to the land itself.
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v. R.47 have long held that Aboriginal title to land can include an interest
in the standing timber.
Finally, the Westbank First Nation challenged provincial
jurisdiction over forestry by cutting over one hundred truckloads of trees
on Crown land. The Ministry of Forests issued a stop work order, but
when it sought to enforce it in court, the First Nation countered with an
Aboriginal rights and title claim. In British Columbia (Ministerof Forests)
v. Westbank FirstNation,42 the First Nation sought clarification of the
issues to be addressed at the hearing brought by the ministry by
challenging the constitutionality of the law under which the stop work
order was issued on the basis that it infringed Aboriginal rights and title.
The court held that the Aboriginal rights and title question should be
heard at the same time as the other issues because the constitutionality
of the law in question was a valid defence to the ministry's petition.
These cases are early signs of the potential of the Supreme Court of
Canada decision in Delgamuukw43 to have a significant impact on Crown
management of forested lands.
c) Delgamuukw v. British Columbia-AboriginalTitle
In December 1997, the Supreme Court of Canada released its
decision in Delgamuukw, outlining the content and nature of Aboriginal
title.44 The Court reconfirmed the sui generis or unique characteristics of
Aboriginal title: it is inalienable; it arises from the prior occupation of
Canada by Aboriginal peoples and their pre-existing systems of
Aboriginal law; and it is held communally. Aboriginal title is a burden on
Crown title. Chief Justice Lamer enunciated two principles regarding the
content of Aboriginal title: first, "aboriginal title encompasses the right
to use the land held pursuant to that title for a variety of purposes, which
need not be aspects of those aboriginal practices, cultures and traditions
which are integral to distinctive aboriginal cultures;" 4S and second, that
those "lands held pursuant to title cannot be used in a manner that is
41 (1888), 14 A.C. 46 (P.C.), aff'g (1887), 13 S.C.R. 577.
42 [1999] B.C.J. No. 2161 (B.C. S.C.), online: QL (BCJ).
43

Supra note 12.

44 The original claim had been brought by fifty-seven Houses of the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en
peoples for "ownership and jurisdiction" of their traditional territory: see Delganuukw v. British
Cohnbia (1991), 79 D.L.R. (4th) 185 (B.C. S.C.). This became a claim for Aboriginal title at the

Supreme Court of Canada.
45 Supra note 12 at 1083.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 37 No. 4

irreconcilable with the nature of the claimants' attachment to those
lands." 46 Aboriginal title is a unique proprietary interest in the land.
While Aboriginal title does not limit First Nations' use of the land only
to traditional activities, at the same time and arising from the unique
relationship with the land, uses that threaten the future relationship with
the land are inconsistent with such title. If Aboriginal title is established
through evidence of traditional practices such as hunting, fishing, and
spiritual practices, the value of the land for that use cannot be destroyed,
for example, by strip mining or putting up a parking lot.47
What the inalienability of lands held pursuant to Aboriginal title
suggests is that those lands are more than just a fungible commodity.
The relationship between an Aboriginal community and the lands over
which it has Aboriginal title has an important non-economic component.
The land has an inherent and unique value in itself, which is enjoyed by
the community that holds Aboriginal title to it. "The community cannot
put the land to uses which would destroy that value." 48
Once it affirmed that section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982
fully protects Aboriginal title, the Court explored the justification
procedure for infringement of that title. As established in Sparrow49 and

Gladstone,5O infringement of an Aboriginal right must be in furtherance
of a legislative objective that is "compelling and substantial," and is
subject to an assessment of whether the infringement is consistent with
the special fiduciary relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal
peoples.S/ Three elements of Aboriginal title are relevant when
46

Ibid at 1088.

47

1bid. at 1089.
1bid. at 1090.

48
49

Supra note 23.

50

Supra note 25.

51 Delgamuukw, supra note 12 at 1107-09. The Court ruled, at 1109, that a broad range of
legislative objectives can be justified as part of the "reconciliation of the prior occupation of North
America by aboriginal peoples with the assertion of Crown sovereignty," and the existence of
Aboriginal societies within non-Aboriginal political and economic contexts. Chief Justice Lamer
cited agriculture, forestry, mining, and hydroelectric power, the general economic development of

the interior of British Columbia, protection of the environment or endangered species, the building
of infrastructure, and the settlement of foreign populations as justifiable legislative objectives.
However, each situation must be examined on a case-by-case basis.
These justifications pose a complex problem when read with paragraphs 177 and 178 of the
judgment. The Court explains that section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 12,
protects a "core" of Indianness from provincial interference through the doctrine of
interjurisdictional immunity. This includes Aboriginal rights in relation to land: provincial
governments cannot legislate in respect of the core of Indianness so described. This apparent
conflict between federal jurisdiction over Aboriginal rights and a province's ability to justify

1999]

AboriginalForestry

725

considering the fiduciary duty of the Crown: (1) Aboriginal title includes
the right to exclusive use and occupation; (2) the right to choose to what
use the land is put; and (3) an economic entitlement.5 2 The nature of the
fiduciary relationship varies depending on the nature of the Aboriginal
right. For example, when allocating resources, the exclusive nature of
Aboriginal title may require the government to "reflect the prior
interest," both procedurally and substantively, of Aboriginal title
holders.5 3 This could include Aboriginal involvement in the development
of natural resources and decisions affecting traditional lands, such as
awarding fee simple title for agriculture, and allocating leases and
licences for forestry and mining.5 4 At a minimum, consultation "in good
faith, and with the intention of substantially addressing the concerns of
the aboriginal peoples whose lands are at issue" is requiredSS In some
cases the full consent of a nation will be required; for example, when
hunting or fishing regulations apply to traditional lands. The economic
component of Aboriginal title, coupled with the fiduciary duty of the
Crown, requires that compensation be awarded for infringement of title
rights.56
Finally, the Court reaffirmed that jurisdiction to make laws in
57
relation to Aboriginal title rests with the federal government.
However, although section 88 of the Indian ActS8 enables provincial laws
of general application to apply to "Indians," such laws cannot touch on
Aboriginal rights or other matters at the heart of Aboriginal identity.S9
The Court concluded with an encouragement to the parties to enter into
treaty negotiations, emphasizing the Crown's "moral, if not legal, duty"
to negotiate in good faith.60
infringing those rights must be left for further judicial consideration: see A. Peeling, "Provincial
Jurisdiction After Delgamuukiv" in Aboriginal Title Update (Vancouver: Continuing Legal Education
Society of British Columbia, 1998) 2.1 at 2.1.01-2.1.09.
52 See Delganuukv, supra note 12 at 1111-12.

53 The Court adopts an approach set out in Gladstone, supra note 25 at 767: "[T]he
government must demonstrate both that the process by which it allocated the resource and the

actual allocation of the resource which results from that process reflect the prior interest" of the
holders of Aboriginal title to the land.
54 See Delgamuukv, supra note 12 at 1112.
55 ibid. at 1113.

56 ibid. at 1113-14.
57

ibid. at 1118.

58

Supra note 14.

59 See Delgamuukw, supra note 12 at 1120.
60

ibid. at 1123.
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On its face, the Supreme Court of Canada decision in
Delgamuukw has wide ranging implications for forestry, and specifically
for forestry practices on Aboriginal title lands. 6 1 The Court recognized
systems of Aboriginal government and law as part of Aboriginal title. In
a climate where many Crown agencies will only deal with band
governments established pursuant to the IndianAct, traditional systems
of governance, specifically those of the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en who
brought the Delgamuukw case, were affirmed. The Court refused to
place a "strait-jacket" on First Nations by limiting the scope of
Aboriginal title to traditional practices, thus allowing for commercial
uses so long as they are consistent with the continued enjoyment of
historic uses of the land.
This sustainability limit, coupled with the communal nature of
Aboriginal title, creates a model of collective decisionmaking that must
maintain the ecological integrity of traditional lands necessary to support
historic practices. 62 Individual Aboriginal people are not able to use
their Aboriginal title for personal gain. Decisions regarding title lands
must be made by an Aboriginal community. Given that Aboriginal title
burdens Crown title, it can be argued that this sustainability limit also
applies to the Crown. 63 If the Crown infringes on Aboriginal title, for
example, by clearcutting and adversely affecting activities that create the
foundation for title, compensation is owed.

61 The non-judicial commentary on the decision to date ranges from "business as usual" and a
"wait and see" attitude, to questioning the authority of provincial governments to make decisions

about lands and resources. For the former approach, see J. Hunter, "Consent and Consultation
After Delgamuukw: Practical Implications for Forestry and Mining in British Columbia" in
Aboriginal Title Update, supra note 51, 7.3; and C. Figol, "Delgamuukw v. B.C.: Views for Discussion

on the Fiduciary Relationship and Corresponding Obligations Between the Federal Government
and Aboriginal Peoples" in ibid, 3.1. For a more radical assessment, see L. Mandell, "The
Delgamuukw Decision" in ibid., 7.2. See also K. McNeil, "The Onus of Proof of Aboriginal Title"
(1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 775 [hereinafter "Onus of Proof of Aboriginal Title"]; K. McNeil,

"Aboriginal Title and the Division of Powers: Rethinking Federal and Provincial Jurisdiction"
(1998) 61 Sask. L. Rev. 431; K. Wilkins, "Of Provinces and Section 35 Rights" (1999) 22 Dal. L.J.
185; and N. Bankes, "Delgamuukw, Division of Powers and Provincial Land and Resource Laws:

Some Implications for Provincial Resource Rights" (1998) 32 U.B.C. L. Rev. 317.
62 This limit of sustainability can be circumvented by surrendering the land and foregoing
Aboriginal title claim to it: see Delganuakw,supra note 12 at 1091.
63 It may be argued that because sustainability is a limitation on Aboriginal title, this

qualification is also a limitation on the title held by the provincial Crown. This argument follows
from the Court's findings, discussed below, that Aboriginal title is a limitation on the exercise of

provincial Crown power, and that the province has no power to extinguish Aboriginal title. Should
the province exercise its power so as to deny the sustainability of Aboriginal title, it will be
unlawfully infringing upon and possibly extinguishing Aboriginal title: see Mandell, supra note 61 at
7.2.05.
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Extending the Crown's fiduciary duty to include compensation
and "meaningful consultation" places a greater burden on the Crown to
inform itself of Aboriginal title rights. Generally, Aboriginal title accords
First Nations an element of decisionmaking authority on title lands. This
suggests a legal requirement to co-management or the provision of
exclusive rights, such as licences and leases, to First Nations. Following
the Haida Nation64 decision, Aboriginal title, at minimum, is an
encumbrance on Crown title and limits the British Columbia Ministry of
Forest's ability to renew Crown tenures.
Finally, the Court's statements about federal jurisdiction over
Aboriginal title and title lands calls into question provincial Crown
authority over forested lands. Since provincial laws of general
application cannot affect Aboriginal title, including Aboriginal peoples'
right to the exclusive use and occupation of their land, then, in the
absence of treaties, provincial governments are severely hampered in
their ability to regulate resource development. Likewise, if the federal
government has sole jurisdiction to legislate with respect to Aboriginal
title, that may include a positive duty to protect Aboriginal title rights. 6S
However, these potential ramifications of Delgamuukw are
tempered by the reality that there is no legal recognition of Aboriginal
title without proof establishing its existence. This requires a court
decision or treaty settlement. Until title is established, on a nation-bynation basis, the economic and exclusive use rights of Aboriginal title are
superseded by Crown management of traditional lands. 66 The only
immediate practical effect of Delgamuukw has been a heightened
awareness and broadened scope of the duty to consult.
For example, the first case to be decided in British Columbia in
this new context established by Delgamuukw was Cheslatta CarrierNation
v. British Columbia (EnvironmentalAssessment Act, Project Assessment
Director).6 7 The petitioners sought judicial review of decisions made
under the provincial environmental assessment legislation approving the
6

4 Supra note 39.

65 See Restructuring the Relationship,supra note 5 at 641-42, where the Royal Commission
supports this view, recommending that:
(a) the federal government work with the provinces, the territories, and Aboriginal
communities to improve Aboriginal access to forest resources on Crown lands;
(b) the federal government, as part of its obligation to protect traditional
Aboriginal activities on provincial Crown lands, actively promote Aboriginal
involvement in provincial forest management and planning; as with the model
forest program, this would include bearing part of the costs ....
66 But see "Onus of Proof of Aboriginal Title," supra note 61.
67(1998), 53 B.C.L.R. (3d) 1 (S.C.).
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development of a mine in their traditional territory. Specifically, they
had requested wildlife maps and other information to determine how the
mine would affect their traditional practices and all aspects of their lives.
Finding that meaningful consultation had not occurred, the court ruled
that consultation includes the duty to discuss issues and take the
concerns of the affected First Nation seriously. The Crown has a duty to
fully inform itself of the relevant issues, and the First Nation is entitled
to sufficient information to assess the project's impact on their
Aboriginal rights. 68 Likewise, the First Nation has a duty to cooperate in
the consultation efforts. The petitioners were awarded a procedural
remedy; the respondents were ordered to furnish the requested
information and to consult meaningfully in the future.
More than two years after the Supreme Court of Canada handed
down its expansive affirmation of Aboriginal title in Delgamuukw, the
law still offers First Nations little more than a right of consultation and
an ethereal promise of no infringement of Aboriginal rights. Until land
claims settlements are negotiated or Aboriginal title cases are brought to
court, status quo forestry continues on traditional lands and Aboriginal
peoples have a very narrow, essentially procedural, avenue through
which they can oppose ecosystem destruction. On the ground, provincial
governments have expressed a "lack of authority" to enter into First
Nations-initiated, interim cooperative land management agreements
that reflect the consultative principles set out in Delgamuukw.69
At the same time, Aboriginal peoples have no direct
management control over activities on traditional lands except through
participation in the existing tenure system. This system is characterized
by volume-based timber extraction by large corporations, with little
regard for the maintenance of either ecosystem integrity or the quality of
life of the community in which they are operating. As the cases discussed
above demonstrate, the legislated tenure system for industrial logging
often operates in direct opposition to traditional Aboriginal uses that are
68 The Court relied on R. v.Jack (1995), 131 D.L.R. (4th) 165 (B.C. C.A.) for the positive duty
on the Crown to "fully inform itself."
69 For example, the Gitxsan Nation approached the British Columbia Ministry of Forests with
a draft agreement for the planning and management of forest use within the Gitxsan traditional
territory, which included detailed consultation and dispute resolution processes. The ministry
refused to sign it on the basis that parts of the agreement related to the assertion of Aboriginal title,
and that staff workload was already too onerous to allow for landscape level plans that included
more than biodiversity values. The ministry was waiting for a formal government response to
Delgamuukw. See Gitxsan Treaty Office, A CooperativeAgreement to Plan and Manage Forest Use:
Draft 12 (2 July 1998); and letters between Don Ryan, Chief Negotiator, Gitxsan Nation and Shane
Berg, District Manager, Kispiox Forest District, British Columbia Ministry of Forests (6 & 31 July
1998) [on file with authors].
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the foundation of Aboriginal title. In addition, Aboriginal peoples who
participate in the logging industry must adopt the hierarchical corporate
structures of that industry, a structure that does not reflect many
Aboriginal customs and traditional community decisionmaking
approaches. The broader cultural interests of the First Nation are
necessarily neglected in favour of a narrow focus on the technical and
profit-driven character of forestry operations. This is in conflict with
many Aboriginal peoples' goal of integrating traditional values with
economic development.
2. Legislative reform
In response to this lack of Crown action affirming Aboriginal
rights, Aboriginal peoples have developed model federal legislation,
including the FirstNations Forest Resources ManagementAct (FNFRMA),
created by the National Aboriginal Forestry Association (NAFA) in
consultation with the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern
Development (DIAND). The intention of such legislation is to establish a
framework for First Nations to manage and control their forest
resources on reserve and traditional lands.7 0 The management would be
subject to a First Nation Forest Practices Code ("Code"), to be
developed under the FNFRMA. First Nations' band councils may "elect to
exercise authority over forests through the agency of this act" by
designating reserves, with the agreement of federal and provincial
governments, and traditional lands as forest lands, and by adopting an
integrated forest management plan. 71 In preparing the forest
management plan, the band councils must consult with each member of
the First Nation, as detailed in the Code.72 Through FNFRMA,
participating First Nations would have the legal capacity to negotiate
arrangements with provinces for forest management on traditional lands,
and to enacts laws for the protection of forest lands, silviculture, the
raising of revenue, and the enforcement of penalties. First Nations
70 See NAFA Proposal,supra note 2; and R. Wiltshire, "Aboriginal Forestry Workshop Sets
Pace" Anishinabek News (May 1994) 9.
71 National Aboriginal Forestry Association, Proposalfor a First Nation Forest Resources
Management Act, NAFA Draft No. 05 (Ottawa: National Aboriginal Forestry Association, 1993) s. 9
[hereinafter NAFA Draft]. See also NAFA Proposal,supra note 2 at 4.
72 Under section 15 of the Code, a First Nation must submit a forest management plan to a
First Nation Forestry Board, together with a report describing the consultation undertaken with
band members. The Board determines whether or not the plan and report conform to the Code: see
NAFA Draft,supra note 71.
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would be required to enter into a multi-year funding arrangement with
the Crown. The Crown's fiduciary obligation to manage First Nations
forests would continue, although it would be relieved of that
responsibility to the extent that First Nations undertake activities
pursuant to the draft legislation.
Similarly, the First Nations Land Management Act (FNLMA) was
recently enacted by Parliament.7 3 The Act codifies a 1996 Framework
Agreement enabling the transfer of reserve land management from the
Crown to, initially, fourteen First Nations.74 Through negotiations with
the federal government, a First Nation may develop a land code that, if
approved by a majority of at least 25 per cent of the Nation's eligible
voting members, will govern land management of reserve lands.75
Powers under the land code, Framework Agreement, and the FNLMA
include the ability to:
a)
b)
c)
d)

exercise the powers, rights and privileges of an owner in relation to that land;
grant interests in and licences in relation to that land;
manage the natural resources of that land; and
receive and use all moneys acquired by or on behalf of the first nation under its land
code. 76

Under this agreement, the ability to grant timber cutting licences
and manage forests on reserves is transferred from the Crown to the
First Nation, and the First Nation may enact laws respecting the
development, conservation, protection, management, use, and
possession of reserve land.7 7 First Nation laws dealing with
environmental protection must meet the minimum standards set by the
legislation of the province in which the First Nation land is situated. 78
73 S.C. 1999, c. 24 [hereinafter FNi.MA].

74 The First Nations are Westbank; Musqueam; Fort George (also known as Lheit-Lit'en and
Lheidli T'enneh); Anderson Lake (also known as N'Quatqua); Squamish, Siksika Nation, John
Smith (also known as Muskoday); Cowessess; The Pas (also known as Opaskwayak Cree); Nipissing
Band of Ojibways (also known as Nipissing); Scugog (also known as Mississaugas of Scugog Island);
Chippewas of Rama (also known as Chippewas of Mnjikaning); Chippewas of Georgina Island; and
Saint Mary's.
75 Section 12(1) of the FNI.MA, supra note 73, requires a majority of eligible voters to
participate in the vote and a majority of those voters to approve the land code. It also allows for
approval by a community in any other manner agreed to by the First Nation and the minister of
Indian Affairs "and Northern Development. However, section 12(2) allows that "[n]otwithstanding
subsection (1), a proposed land code and an individual agreement are not approved unless more
than twenty-five per cent of the eligible voters voted to approve them."
76
Ibid,s. 18.
77

Ibid, s. 20(1)(b).

78

Ibid., s. 21.
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In the absence of cooperation with other levels of government,
these proposed and actual legislative reforms are, however, of limited
utility for many bands that do not have forested reserve land that is large
enough to accommodate traditional uses or provide employment for
band members. Conceivably, these initiatives could offer a transition for
bands taking over forest management through treaty negotiations or
from the assertion of Aboriginal title. However, as drafted, the extension
of the FNLMA to non-reserve lands would be contingent on the goodwill
of each province to negotiate cooperative agreements with First
Nations. 79
Moreover, although neither the FNFRMA nor the FNLMA mentions
ecosystem integrity, this is left up to each First Nation to develop.
FNFRMA provides for "an integrated forest resource management plan
that reflects its values and priorities.... [T]he First Nation is accountable
to its membership for forest management." 80 If these plans are prepared
using status quo "multiple use" forestry criteria, then ecosystem integrity
will continue to be ignored.8 ' If, however, plans are developed with
community input and with the protection of those activities on which
Aboriginal title is based, such legislation would be an important step
towards merging Aboriginal self-government with ecosystem-based
management.8 2
Some provinces have also enacted new legislation dealing with
forest practices that will have an impact on Aboriginal peoples.8 3 The

79 As discussed in Part IV(A), below, it appears that few provinces are willing to take that
step, and of those that are (such as British Columbia and Quebec under the James Bay Agreement)
it is yet unclear whether co-management agreements are more than formalized consultation. In
addition, co-management does not adequately address non-economic forestry values, as discussed
further in this article.
80
NAFA Proposal,supra note 2 at 6.
81 "Multiple use" policies aim to take into account different resource values on each land unit,
such as wilderness and timber production. Managing for competing uses on the same area of land is
difficult, as industrial logging-the primary use among multiple users-often takes place on the
richest economic, and ecological, timber lands: see C. Burda et aL, Forestsin Trust: Reforming British
Columbia's Forest Tenure System for Ecosystem and Community Health (Victoria: Eco-Research
Chair, Environmental Law & Policy, 1997) at 23. Such an approach ignores ecosystem and cultural
boundaries, and unique areas.
82 This new culturally-based planning that draws on community input is enshrined in
guidelines prepared for NAFA by professional foresters: see P. Smith, G. Scott & G. Merkel,
Aboriginal Forest Land Management Guidelines: A Community Approach (Ottawa: National
Aboriginal Forestry Association, 1995) [hereinafter NAFA Guidelines], as discussed in Part
Il(A)(3)(b), below.
83 See, for example, the Forest PracticesCode of British Columbia Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 159;
and the Crown ForestsSustainabilityAct, S.O. 1994, c. 25.
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purpose of the Ontario Crown Forests SustainabilityAct (cFSA) is to
provide for "the sustainability of Crown forests ...to meet social,
economic and environmental needs of present and future generations."8 4
The minister must establish local citizens' committees to advise the
minister on forest management planning and on other matters of
concern to the committees. The minister may also enter into agreements
with First Nations for the "joint exercise of authority of the Minister
....
"85 Despite this seeming potential for implementing the sort of comanagement initiatives that have long been sought by First Nations, the
CFSA does not alter the tenure arrangements on which management
processes would be founded. Because the existing system of forest
licences continues under the new Act, it cannot provide new
opportunities for the implementation of ecosystem-based management.
3. Policies and programs
a) Federalandprovincial
For reserve lands under federal jurisdiction, DIAND has never had
a comprehensive forest management program. Until the late 1980s,
DIAND employed a few staff foresters for the purpose of approving
cutting permits and providing some technical assistance. No
comprehensive forest management planning was undertaken and,
according to foresters working with First Nations, the result was
overcutting and mismanagement of reserve lands.8 6 To address this
problem, First Nations, the federal government, and provincial
84 Crown ForestsSustainabilityAct, supra note 83, s. 1. For a discussion of the legislation, see
National Aboriginal Forestry Association, Aboriginal Forestry: Lessons in the Making. Selected

Conference Proceedings of NAFA, 23-25 October 1995 (Ottawa: National Aboriginal Forestry
Association, 1996) at 6; and National Aboriginal Forestry Association, An Assessment of the
Potentialfor Aboriginal Business Development in the Ontario Forest Sector (Ottawa: National

Aboriginal Forestry Association, 1995) at 15 [hereinafter NAFA Assessment].
85

Crown ForestsSustainabilityAct, supra note 83, ss. 13,23.

86 See interview with P. Smith, Registered Professional Forester, NAFA (15 July 1996); and
interview with J.Masai, Registered Professional Forester, Brentwood Bay, British Columbia (23
November 1995). One example is the experience of the Fort William Band in Thunder Bay,
Ontario. As an interview with S.Cyrette, Forestry Technician for the Mizhinawae Economic
Development Corporation and member of the Fort William Band (October 1995) indicated, on the

5,000 hectare reserve 70 per cent of the timber has been cut by band members in the past fifteen
years. During this time, no regulatory framework existed to ensure sustainable forest management,
nor was there any requirement that money collected in stumpage be used for reforestation. The

band council continued to approve cutting permits because of the economic needs of its members.
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governments have developed successive multi-year funding agreements
87
to regenerate reserve lands and to develop forest management plans.
Most recently, the Federal government has committed to funding a First
Nation Forestry Program until 2000. While this funding is not in keeping
with historic levels of funding, the program includes off-reserve lands
and encourages partnerships between First Nations, forest industry
corporations, and provinces.8 8
In British Columbia, the provincial government committed itself
in 1992 to a sweeping new approach to its relations with Aboriginal
peoples by recognizing their inherent right to self-government, and by
agreeing to "government to government" relations and "joint
stewardship."8 9 While the government has not broadly implemented this
policy, recommendations from the 1991 British Columbia Claims Task
Force led to the creation of some co-management arrangements via
"interim measures agreements" pending the settlement of treaties.9 0 In
addition, as a result of the British Columbia Court of Appeal
Delgamuukw decision, the provincial government developed a policy that

87

See NAFA Summary, supra note 6 at 1. Funding for the Indian Lands Program (iLP) under
the national Forest Resource Development Agreements (FRDAS) was completed in 1995-1996.
FRDAS were agreements between the federal and provincial government to fund forest activities, of
which the ILP was only one part. FRDAS were in place in each province, except Quebec, from 1990
until 1995 or, for British Columbia, until 1996. Delivered in conjunction with the Canadian Forest
Service, the $47 million ILP supported silviculture activities, Geographic Information Systems
mapping of traditional lands, development of twenty-year management plans, and training.
88 In light of this funding, DIAND and the Canadian Forest Service take the position that First
Nations will be self-sufficient in forestry by 2001. Some Aboriginal foresters are concerned that joint
ventures, as encouraged under the Program, will shift the regulation of, and support for, Aboriginal
forestry into the provincial sphere. In such instances, provinces could be in a conflict of interest as
they attempt to fulfil their resource management responsibilities and also uphold federal Aboriginal
rights that cannot always be reconciled with provincial objectives. Some believe that continued
federal involvement would more adequately ensure protection of Aboriginal rights under provincial
management regimes: interview with P. Smith, supra note 86.
89 See Province of British Columbia, Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs, Joint Stewardship
(Victoria: Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs, 1992) at 1, where joint stewardship was defined as a
"framework for British Columbia's government-to-government relations with First Nations on all
aspects of land and resource management within traditional territories, including cultural resources
such as archaeological sites and ethnographic sites. Joint stewardship will operate outside of or
parallel to formal treaty negotiations."
90 See Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs, British Columbia Claims Task Force (Victoria: Ministry
of Aboriginal Affairs, 1991). Specifically, recommendation 16 stated that parties should negotiate
interim measures agreements if an issue would impede the treaty negotiation process. The most
notable of these (discussed below) is the government's agreement with the HawaiiH of the Tla-oqui-aht First Nations, the Ahousaht First Nation, the Hesquiaht First Nation, the Toquaht First
Nation, and the Ucluelet First Nation.
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requires consultation with First Nations.91 The Ministry of Forests now
requires a risk assessment of operational forestry planning processes.
Basically a procedural device, it is left to the ministry to decide what is
an Aboriginal right, and whether risking infringement of that right is
justified. Thus, the duty to consult does not ensure blanket protection of
traditional values. It can affect the way that logging is carried out on a
site-specific basis if agreement is reached between the parties. These
policies still apply; no substantive changes to ministry operations have
been made in the aftermath of the Supreme Court of Canada decision in
Delgamuukw. The Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs has created additional
consultation guidelines to assist government staff in assessing whether or
not Aboriginal title potentially exists. Once again, these guidelines are
procedural in effect. The guidelines specifically state that no Aboriginal
title has been proven in British Columbia and that compensation is
solely the responsibility of the federal government. 92
b) FirstNations
In light of the limitations of Aboriginal rights on traditional
lands, the most innovative initiatives for First Nations' forestry are
coming from Aboriginal peoples and organizations. The leading
advocacy organization is the National Aboriginal Forestry Association
(NAFA), formed in 1989. NAFA developed the Aboriginal Forest Land
Management Guidelines (NAFA Guidelines) that sets out a broad and
flexible framework for Aboriginal peoples to develop and implement
community- and ecosystem-based forest management planning that
takes into account multiple forest values. 93 The NAFA Guidelines
91 The Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs developed a broad policy framework under which the
Ministry of Forests produced the Protection of Aboriginal Rights Policy: see British Columbia,
Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs, Crown Land Activities and Aboriginal Rights Policy Framework

(Victoria: Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs, 1997); and British Columbia Ministry of Forests, Ministry
Policy Manual v. 1(15):-ProtectionofAboriginalRights (Victoria: Ministry of Forests, 1997).
92 See British Columbia, Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs, Consultation Guidelines (Victoria:
Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs, 1998).
93 See NAFA Guidelines,supra note 82. The following five principles are set out, at 1-2, as the

basis of the Guidelines. They provide for Aboriginal communities to:
1. Ensure that the community guides and accumulates wisdom about all aspects of
forest land care.
2. Ensure that Aboriginal forest lands are protected and their management enhanced
so as to optimize long term social, spiritual, environmental and economic values.
3. Ensure that forest land management embraces all parts of the forest, including
plants, animals, soil, air and water, and all forest users.
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specifically address the inadequacies of the Indian Act, 94 and stress the
importance of soils, plants, water, fish, wildlife, and other forest values
for Aboriginal communities and forest integrity. Planning for
biodiversity and the protection of special management areas are laid out
in separate chapters. Community participation in forest planning is
considered critical to effective management:
Those who are closest to the land and experience the direct consequences of land use
decisions should be the ones who are consulted first and last. By providing informed
consent, community members will help to ensure that those who carry out forest land use
activities care for the land properly. 9 5

Reliance on this connection to the land is the basis for the
regulation and monitoring provisions set out in the NAFA Guidelines.
Community members would provide feedback on land management

practices, both through immediate observations and regularly scheduled
assessments. 96 This connection to the land has been recognized outside
of First Nations communities as the essential, ecologically-based,
political justification for special Aboriginal tenures. 97 While the NAFA
4.
5.

Ensure that the diversity of Aboriginal communities as distinct societies with their
own languages, cultures, values and customs is respected.
Be acceptable and optional to Aboriginal communities.

94

Supra note 14.
95 NAFA Guidelines, supra note 82 at II-1. This community-based perspective is seen by others
as one of the inherent characteristics of Aboriginal forestry, see, for example, J. Hill & H. Arnett,
"Understanding Indian Tribal Timber Sales" (1995) 9:3 Natural Resources and the Environment 38
at 70:
Tribes will not cut the forests and move on. The forests comprise part of their permanent
homelands, supporting tribal religions and cultures, providing for the health and welfare
of tribal members in a spiritual as well as a financial sense. The care that many tribes
show for their forests is not merely based upon economic interests. Rather, it
reverberates to the very essence of their culture and existence.
However, not all Aboriginal peoples do, or will, manage traditional lands on this basis. For example,
the focus of the Native Investment and Trade Association Conference, "Aboriginal Forestry in
Canada 1997" (17-18 April 1997, Vancouver) was on acquiring forestry tenures, structuring
Aboriginal business ventures, and joint ventures.
96 See NAFA Guidelines,supra note 82 at 11-3.
97 See "Developing Sustainability," supra note 8 at 82-83. It can be argued that the Supreme
Court of Canada's decision in Delgamuukw supports such an approach. Authors writing on
Aboriginal forestry in other areas also cite local community-based forest management as inherently
protectionist. The greater the local reliance on the ecosystem, the greater the incentive to protect
the natural resources: see O.J. Lynch & K. Talbott, Balancing Acts: Community-Based Forest
Management and National Law in Asia and the Pacific (Washington: World Resources Institute,
1995). Finally, such community-based management has fundamental implications for industrial
forestry as it relocates the locus of control over resource management: see, for example, M.
M'Gonigle, "Structural Instruments and Sustainable Forests: A Forest Ecology Approach" in C.
Tollefson, ed., The Wealth of Forests: Markets, Regulation, and Sustainable Forestry (Vancouver:
University of British Columbia Press, 1998) 102; and M. M'Gonigle, "Living Communities in a
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Guidelines promote traditional community control, the issue remains
whether Aboriginal peoples will actually be allowed, either through
specific new tenures or general treaty negotiations, both to manage
resources through a traditional connection to the land and to support
those social and regulatory controls that will ensure community
regulation of an ecosystem-based forestry regime, as outlined in
Delgamuukw.
4. Treaty negotiations

-

In theory, treaty negotiations over land claims and selfgovernment should have the greatest potential in the legal realm for
reshaping Aboriginal resource management and giving effect to the sole
or joint decisionmaking power set out in Delgamuukw. When concluded,
these settlements will combine changes to constitutional, legislative, and
property rights in a comprehensive legal package. In forestry, several
new types of tenure arrangements are theoretically possible. First
Nations could obtain fee simple ownership to land, which includes all
rights to manage forests. They could negotiate revenue-sharing
arrangements over wide areas with government or corporations through
existing or modified tenures on traditional lands. They could enter into
co-management or joint stewardship arrangements for traditional lands.
Treaty rights have not extended in the past to include forest
management on traditional land bases, so innovations embodying joint
stewardship and other broad management rights could offer an
important new conceptual approach to resolving Aboriginal/nonAboriginal resource conflicts.
In practice, the policies of provincial governments continue to
impede the development of innovative landholding arrangements. In
British Columbia, the province negotiates on the basis of a "land
selection" model whereby the total land to be held by First Nations in
fee simple would be no more than 5 per cent of the provincial land base.
Outside this area, the treaty-making process is designed to avoid
disruption of existing interests in land, such as leases and licences.98 The
remaining traditional lands will continue to be owned and managed by
the Crown, with some Aboriginal involvement in planning and

Living Forest: Towards an Alternative Structure of Local Tenure and Management" in ibid., 152,
98 See British Columbia, Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs, InformationAbout ...The Effect of
Treaty Settlement on Crown Leases and Licences (Victoria: Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs, 1995).
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management if specifically negotiated as part of each treaty settlement. 99
Such requirements are contrary to the Delgamuukw decision, especially

in light of the Supreme Court of Canada's affirmation of traditional
governance systems and laws. Some Aboriginal groups define and
regulate their societies through their unique relationship to the land.
Settlements based on the "land selection" model undermine this
relationship, and such limitation of Aboriginal title rights would require

substantial compensation.
How these policies will play out is now illustrated by the first

modern treaty settlement in British Columbia, the agreement reached by
the federal and provincial governments on 4 August 1998 with the
Nisga'a Nation.100 Its provisions are a significant departure from
Delgamuukw-defined Aboriginal title rights.1 01 It does not uphold the
traditional governance system of the Nisga'a, nor offer sustainability
limits-especially in the wider traditional territory-for ecosystem-based
management.1 02 Even in the small proportion of their traditional land
base where the Nisga'a will have fee simple title (1,992 square kilometres
in the Nass Valley), they will be held, for five years, to an allowable

annual cut agreed upon by the Ministry of Forests and apportioned
between existing licence holders.1 03 In addition, they will not be able to
establish their own primary timber processing facility for ten years,
making their economic development in forest products dependent on

99 See British Columbia, Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs, British Columbia'sApproach to Treaty
Settlements: Lands and Resources (Victoria: Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs, 1996) [hereinafter B.C.
Approach].
100 Nisga'aAgreement, supra note 11. The federal government and Nisga'a Nation began
negotiating this treaty in the 1970s. The provincial government joined the treaty table in 1990. The
treatycame into force in May 2000: see Nisga"aFinalAgreementAct (B.C.),supra note 11; and Nisga'a
FinalAgreementAct (Can.), supra note 11.
101 See Nisga'aAgreement, supra note 11. Indeed, c. 2, ss. 22-25 specifically acknowledges that
the Agreement fully exhausts Nisga'a constitutional and Aboriginal rights. In particular, section 24
states: "Notwithstanding the common law ... the Aboriginal rights ... are modified, and continue as
modified .... "
102 For example, "Nisga'a Nation" is defined in c. 1, ibid., as "the collectivity of those
Aboriginal people who share the language, culture, and laws of the Nisga'a Indians of the Nass
Area, and their descendants." However, the definition of "law," while including the common law
and federal, British Columbia, and Nisga'a legislation, explicitly excludes Nisga'a traditional laws
and practices in clause 1: "but, for greater certainty, does not include Ayuukhl Nisga'a or Ayuuk."
103 During this period, the provincial government has the authority to grant licences for this
timber, and will make payments to the Nisga'a Nation for this timber: ibid., c. 5, ss. 17-18, 27, 72. In
years 6 to 9 of the Agreement, the Nisga'a must authorize additional volumes of timber to be
harvested from Nisga'a lands, similar in amounts to those in years i to 5: ibid., c. 5, s. 22.
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maintaining the goodwill of existing processors.0 4 The sole reference to
forest stewardship in the Agreement is the recognition that "the present
and anticipated efforts of the Nisga'a Nation to restore watersheds
within the Nass Area are consistent with the objectives of British
Columbia Forest Renewal."OS
Overall, we can conclude that the current legal regime of
Aboriginal rights and forest management in Canada prevents Aboriginal
peoples from giving effect to their unique relationship with the land that
underlies Aboriginal title. Notions of exclusive use, collective
decisionmaking, and ecosystem-based management are invisible. The
federal government has jurisdiction over Indians and reserve lands,
while provincial governments manage forests. Aboriginal peoples may
carry out activities on traditional lands, but have no right to revenue
generated from logging nor a role in management of those lands. While
governments must consult with First Nations if an Aboriginal right may
be infringed by a licensed activity, this procedural right has not
significantly changed forestry methods or the timber production
requirements of the tenure system. Aboriginal peoples seek a form of
tenure that not only provides them with access to traditional lands, but
that allows for diverse uses of that land, rather than being held to timber
production standards as required by the Crown. In this regard, it is
instructive to look briefly at the experience of Aboriginal peoples in the
United States to see what, if any, beneficial governance structures have
been developed there.
B. Amefican Context
There are 510 federally recognized Indian tribes in the United
States, which own 23 million hectares of land.106 Aboriginal peoples are
also governed federally in the United States.10 7 Most tribes signed
104 Ibid., c. 5, s. 70. Section 71 allows the Nisga'a to establish timber processing facilities to
provide lumber to the Nisga'a Nation for residential or public purposes, to conduct value-added
processing, or to enter into a joint venture with the owner of an existing timber processing facility.
105 Ibid., c. 5, s. 73. The effects of the current treaty process are discussed in more detail
below.
106 See M.C. Wood, "Indian Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty: The Trust Doctrine

Revisited" [1994] Utah L. Rev. 1471 at 1476 [hereinafter "Indian Land and the Promise of Native
Sovereignty"].

107 Under the U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, Congress has the power to regulate commerce with
Indian tribes. This responsibility has been augmented to include responsibility for the care and
protection of Indian communities through long-continued legislative, executive, and judicial usage.
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treaties with the federal government that established reservations, and
these often included significant tracts of land. A federal treaty, and a

legislative ratification by Congress of an agreement between the federal
executive branch and an Indian tribe, binds the affected states
notwithstanding that an affected state is not a party to the agreement.1 08
Reservation land is held in trust by the federal government for tribal
Nations, and treaties give the tribes continued rights to hunt, fish, gather
various foods, and use non-reserve lands for religious and ceremonial
purposes.109

Historically, treaty rights did not include the right to cut or
market timber on, or from, reservation land as tribes had only a right of
occupancy.1 0 This position changed because of complaints over timber
waste and loss of economic benefits to Indians.111 In 1910, the Restricted
Trusts Lands Act (RTLI) gave tribes the right to sell timber taken from

"unallotted" reservation lands. 112 This tribal interest in forests on
108 See U.S. Const. art. VI; andAntoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194 (1975).

109 The powers granted to the federal government under the United States Constitution have
been held to include a trust obligation to Indians. The extent and meaning of this trust has been
continually revised by the courts: see Cherokee Nation v. Geogia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 at 17 (1831),
where the trust was described as "resembl[ing] that of a ward to his guardian." More recently, courts
have found a governmental obligation to manage Indian enterprises prudently and in a manner
consistent with accepted professional industry standards: see Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United
States, 91 F. Supp. 917 (Ct. Cl. 1950). For a detailed discussion of the trust relationship, see "Indian
Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty," supra note 106; and M.C. Wood, "Protecting the
Attributes of Native Sovereignty: A New Trust Paradigm for Federal Actions Affecting Tribal
Lands and Resources" [1995] Utah L. Rev. 109.
110 See United States v. Cook, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 591 (1873). There are some important
exceptions to this general rule. For example the Treaty of 4 July 1866, 14 Stat. 793 (Delaware Tribe)
and the Treaty of 6 March 1865, 14 Stat. 667 (Omaha Tribe) both provided for the establishment of
Indian sawmills, which was treated as evidence that the Indians would own the timber on the
reservation: see F.A. Seaton, FederalIndian Law (Washington: United States Government, 1958) at
658.
111 Two Attorney General Opinions, 19 Op. Att'y Gen. 194 (1888) and 19 Op. Att'y Gen. 710
(1890), took the position that tribes had no property interest in timber or proceeds from the sale of
timber. The Board of Indian Commissioners argued that this position was against the best interests
of the United States and Indians because of concerns over timber waste and loss of economic
benefits: see R. Strickland, ed., Cohen's Handbook of FederalIndian Law, rev. ed. (Charlottesville,
Va.: Michie Bobbs-Merrill, 1982) at 539, n. 93.
112 See 25 U.S.C. § 407 (1988). The mrtA did not apply to the Osages Tribes, the Five Civilized
Tribes, and the reservations of Minnesota and Wisconsin: see GeneralLand Allotment Act of 8
February 1887, U.S.S.L. 24:388-91. "Allotment" was the division of tribal lands into separate parcels
for ownership by individual Indians for agriculture. This was part of the national assimilation policy
in 1887 when the federal government implemented the General Land Allotment Act, which
expedited the expropriation of Indian lands for non-Aboriginal miners, ranchers, and farmers. In
return, individual Indians received small, unconnected allotments of land: see D. Champagne, ed.,
The Native North 4mericanAlmanac (Detroit: Gale Research, 1994) at 919. Most allotments were
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reservations was affirmed in the 1938 decision of United States v.
Shoshone Tribe,113 and in subsequent decisions.1 14 The courts held that
treaty rights include the right to use and cut timber located on
reservation land and, while the federal government has the power to
control and manage the property and affairs of the tribes, that authority
must be exercised in good faith for the betterment of the tribe. Courts
also began enforcing this heightened fiduciary duty by holding the
government liable for breaching the trust duty to tribes. 1 5 However, the
trust duty and ability of tribes to cut and market trees from reservations
did not guarantee tribal control of forest resources because the federal
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BiA) was charged with management.
Federal jurisdiction and management precludes state
involvement in Indian lands and forests. In the case of White Mountain
Apache Tribe v. Bracker, the United States Supreme Court held that
federal government regulation of the cutting of Indian timber is
comprehensive and exclusive.11 6 While this simplifies jurisdictional
issues, it also leaves the federal government with conflicting
responsibilities to provide technical assistance and advice, as well as to
monitor the quality of that advice through its role as trustee.1 17 This
sold to non-Indians. The division of Indian lands during this period has proven to be one of the
biggest impediments to effective forest management today: see Hearing before the Select
Committee of Indian Affairs on Indian Forests and Woodlands and the Indian Environmental
Regulations Enhancement Acts, United States Senate, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. (24 April 1990) at 64.
113 304 U.S. 111 (1938). The Supreme Court decision was in response to the enactment of the
Indian ReorganizationAct, c. 576,48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified in 25 U.S.C. § 466 (1988)). TheAct
gave the Secretary of the Interior the power to make rules and regulations for the operation and
management of Indian forestry units on the principle of sustained-yield management. Clause I
defines "sustained yield" as the yield of forest products that a forest can produce continuously at a
given intensity of management. The Act also provided that no further lands were to be allotted, but
long-term leasing of large and commercially valuable tracts of land continued.
114 See United States v. Klamath andMoadoc Tribes, 304 U.S. 119 at 123 (1938); and United
States v. Algoma Lumber Co., 305 U.S. 415 (1939).
115 In the case of Chippewa Indians of Minnesota v. United States, 91 Ct. Cl. 97 (1940), the
court awarded the Chippewa Tribe damages for lost revenues due to the negligence of a
government officer in surveying and preparing yield estimates in connection with a timber sale on its
reservation. Likewise, in the case of Menominee Tribe v. UnitedStates, 59 F. Supp. 137 (Ct. Cl. 1945),
the court held that the government breached its fiduciary responsibility to the tribe when it placed
timber trust funds in a separate fund that paid a lower interest rate, and ordered the government to
pay the difference.
116 448 U.S. 136 at 673 (1980). The 1995 federal regulations are at least as comprehensive as
the federal regulations were at the time of Bracker, so this is likely still the law: see Hill & Arnett,
supra note 95 at 40.
117 See Indian Forest Management Assessment Team, An Assessment of Indian Forests &
Forest Management in the United States (Portland, Or.: Intertribal Timber Council, 1993) at V-37
[hereinafter IFMAT Assessment]. Separating these two responsibilities is one of the
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conflict is akin to that found in Canada whereby federal devolution to
the provinces of responsibility for forest management on reserves may
not adequately protect Aboriginal rights in light of the provinces'
historical interest in commercial forest management.
Unlike Canada, however, recent legislative developments in the
United States have significantly altered the relationship between the
federal government as managers of tribal forestry, and the tribes as
stewards of their own land. In the 1975 Indian Self-Determination and
EducationAssistance Act, 118 the government recognized the effects of
federal domination of tribes, and established new policies and training
programs to facilitate greater self-determination. The legislation also
established, on a trial basis, three different mechanisms through which
tribes could manage their forest lands. These were by contracts,
cooperative agreements, and compact agreements.
A tribe could enter into a contract with the BIA for the BIA to
manage all or part of the tribe's forestry program. It could also enter
into a cooperative agreement to share management responsibility with
the BIA. Both involved a significant BIA role, which in the past had
resulted in the implementation of volume-based, sustained yield
management systems on reservations. More interesting was the ability of
tribes to sign compact agreements, also known as self-governance
agreements. Under such an agreement, a tribe would have control over
the funds normally administered by the BIA for tribal programs. The tribe
could allocate the funds according to its goals, which gave it more
control and flexibility in prioritizing and administering programs. This
approach was codified by the 1994 Tribal Self-Governance Act, which
allows the transfer of administration and control over federal programs
and services to a tribe upon request.1 19 The legislation also recognizes
that the right to self-governance flows from the inherent sovereignty of
Indian tribes and Nations. While some tribal Nations contend that selfgovernance is not equal to sovereignty, "[s]elf-governance can provide
the administrative freedom and the framework for tribes to make
decisions as sovereigns 1 20 If a tribe is prepared to take control of forest
management, this legislation provides an effective governance vehicle.
Complementing this ability to govern, the 1990 NationalIndian
Forest Resources Management Act (NIFRMA) gave tribes the primary
recommendations made to the BIA in this recent Assessment, or report, of Indian forest resources
and their management.
118 Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975).
119 25 U.S.C. Aboriginal Peoples § 458aa (1994).
120 "Focus on the Lummi Nation" (1993) 2:7 Sovereign Nations 3 at 3.
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decisionmaking authority for reservation forests. 121 Section 3108 of
NIFRmA expressly authorizes tribal lawmaking for forest management by
allowing tribes to adopt legislation governing cut levels, when and where
trees will be logged, and the methods to be used. The BIA is required to
comply with tribal laws relating to forestry unless a tribal law conflicts
with a federal statute. Tribal laws are paramount over state laws. 122
The impact of the self-governance and forest management
legislation is significant, as tribes have both control over forest
management on reservation land and the ability to exceed state and
federal standards governing forestry practices. This has a wider effect
than the draft NAFA legislation in Canada because tribes have a large
amount of reservation land and BIA funding with which to manage it.
However, unlike the draft Canadian legislation, NIFRMA does not focus on
ecosystem integrity but on sustained yield and the development of tribal
integrated resource management plans. 123 It is up to individual tribes to
adopt management strategies that are compatible with a community
ecosystem-based management prerogative. Indeed, many tribes have
used this new freedom to initiate innovative forest management, and
some have the cooperation of BIA Trust Officers who automatically
approve plans for the reservation. 124 This flexibility in management is
essential in any governance regime in order for tenure arrangements to
reflect the particular values of diverse Aboriginal peoples and
ecosystems. However, such leeway must be situated within overarching

121 Pub. L. No. 101-630, 104 Stat. 4532 (as codified in 25 U.S.C. § 3101-3120 (1990))
[hereinafter NIwFR,].

122 See 25 C.F.R. § 163. Tribal forestry is also subject to the General Forestry Regulations,
which were updated in 1995 to implement NirtAJ. The Regulations require preparation of

integrated resource management plans which must adhere to tribal and government policies (§
163.11). "Tribal integrated resource management plan" means a document, approved by an Indian
tribe and the Secretary of the Interior, which provides coordination for the comprehensive
management of a tribe's natural resources. According to the BIA, environmental and equity factors,
as well as specific tribal concerns, may create exceptions to this analysis: see Bureau of Indian
Affairs, Indian Forest Management: Foundationfor the Future, 1990-1991 (Washington: Office of
Trust & Economic Development, 1991) at 21 [hereinafter Foundationfor the Future]. There are also
extensive provisions covering forestry education for Indians (§ 163.4). NwItiA places a 10 per cent
ceiling on the amount that the BIA may charge for administering Tribal programs: see NIFRIA, supra

note 121, § 3107. See also 25 C.F.R. § 163.25. In the past, these fees impaired the ability of a tribe to
establish a viable forestry operation: see R. Nafziger, "A Violation of Trust?: Federal Management
of Indian Timber Lands" (1976) 9:4 Indian Historian 15 at 21.
123 See NIERMA, supra note 121.

124 Interview with M. Dukes, President, Makah Tribal Enterprises (14 November 1995), as
described in the examples in Part IV(B), below, of the Makah Tribe. See also the description of the
Menominee Tribe in Part IV(B), below.
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ecological goals in order to ensure long-term community and
environmental sustainability.
To appreciate these self-governance and forestry initiatives, they
must be examined within the regulatory legacy left by the BIA. Until
1975, the BIA operated much like DIAND in Canada, managing and
administering all tribal activities. 125 As with DIAND management, the BIA
was consistently accused of incompetence and violating their federal
trust responsibility.1 26 In order to address BIA mismanagement, and to
assess the state of Indian forest lands, NIFRmA required an independent
study of Indian forest lands and management practices. The Indian
Forest Management Assessment Team (IFMAT) Assessment was
completed in November 1993.127 IFMAT found that there was a significant
disparity between what tribes envisioned for their forests and the state of
their forests under BIA management. IFMAT documented the difference in
funding between Indian forests and comparable federal and private
lands, with non-Indian undertakings receiving greater resources. IFMAT
also found that there was little coordinated resource planning and
management of Indian forestry, and inadequate supervision of the
federal trust responsibility.1 28
The IFMAT recommendations focus on making tribes the
principal agents responsible for coordinated resource management, and
changing the government's role from dealing with individual timber sales
to approving coordinated resource plans. To do this, one suggested
strategy involves tribal communities developing their vision for forest
management to be implemented by the tribal government and tribe's

125 For example, BIA foresters never spoke with tribal nation members when working on the

Yakima reservation or conducting timber sales. The tribe automatically approved BIA actions,
without scrutiny: interview with B. Miller, Resources Management Team, BIA Forestry (7 August

1996).
126 See IFMATAssessment, supra note 117 at ES-5. According to the IFMATAssessment:
the BIA forestry program is not adequately staffed to support coordinated resource
planning and management. There are virtually no staff from specialties such as fisheries,

wildlife, range, and cultural resources.... Although the BIA's direction is to produce
coordinated resource management plans, neither the BIA nor the tribes are adequately

staffed for this task.
Until the introduction of self-governance and compacting agreements, the IA resisted moving funds
and responsibility to the tribal level. Even after the new legislation in 1975, "the Bureau of Indian
Affairs exhibited characteristic reluctance in changing its role from a service provider and manager
of Tribal affairs to an administrator of Self-Determination contracts and grants": "How It All
Began" 7:2 Sovereign Nations 2 at 2. For a detailed review of BIA mismanagement, see Nafziger,
supra note 122.
127 See IFMATAssessment, supra note 117.

128 Ibid. at ES-14.
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natural resources manager. A key recommendation is to protect the
health and productivity of Indian forests through ecosystem
management. 129 If these recommendations are implemented, tribes in
the United States will have comprehensive tools with which to
implement community forest management. Legislation dealing with
forestry and tribal governance allows tribes to take over forest
management on their significant reservation lands. The proposed IFMAT
model envisions tribal communities implementing their forestry vision
with funding from the BIA. 130
Placing this in the Canadian context, tribes in the United States
clearly have more control of reservation forestry. Not only do they have
a larger land base that can sustain logging operations, they may create
their own regulations that all levels of government must apply on that
land. Communities have formal governance mechanisms by which they
can develop forest management suited to their own needs. While few
tribes take an explicitly ecosystem-based approach, the implementation
of the IFMAT Assessment may change that situation. Community
development of integrated resource management plans can address
broader ecosystem values not considered by the BIA. Such an approach
would secure the ecological sustainability of tribal forestry, compared to
Aboriginal involvement in industrial forestry in Canada, as discussed
below.

129 Ibid. at ES-15. More detailed recommendations include, at ES-15-20:
1) developing tribally defined trust standards;
2) making base-line funding and investment of Indian forest management equal to
National Forest funding;
3) encouraging ecosystem management;
4) achieving staffing parity with National Forests having similar resource management
objectives;
5) increasing tree value through improved forest management, timber harvest and
forest enterprise performance; and

6)

greatly strengthening coordinated forest resource planning and natural resource
inventorying.
130 The primary proponent of such an approach is the Intertribal Timber Council (iTC).
Established in 1976, rrC represents seventy-two tribes. It was instrumental in the development of the
,'rnmA,

the forestry regulations, and the IFMAT Assessment: see Foundationfor the Future, supra

note 122 at 18.
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III. ABORIGINAL FORESTRY UNDER GOVERNMENT
TENURES: FORESTS AS TIMBER PRODUCTION
In addition to the general impact that industrial tenures, created
by provincial forestry statutes, have on communities and ecosystems,
these tenures pose additional problems for First Nations.1 3 1 Industrial
logging affects cultural resources and traditional economic activities
such as trapping and fishing. The tenures are not based on traditional
boundaries. A First Nation that acquires, or individual members who
acquire, a government tenure may adversely affect their own or another
community's cultural resources. Tenure holders have no control over
what methods are used in the contracts or tenures on which they are
bidding, as the practices of logging are regulated from outside the
community. When concern is expressed for non-timber values, those
values are usually visible economic interests such as hunting and
trapping, as opposed to non-economic cultural activities such as berrypicking and gathering for basket making.132 General ecological benefits

131 It is beyond the scope of this article to explore how the current industrial tenure system,
with its mandated vertical integration of wood supply and processing facilities, prevents community
ecosystem-based forest management. For such a discussion, see Burda et aL, supra note 81; M.
M'Gonigle & B. Parfitt, Forestopia:A PracticalGuide to the New Forest Economy (Madeira Park,
B.C.: Harbour, 1994); and K. Drushka, B. Nixon & R. Travers, eds., Touch Wood. B.C. Forestsat the
Crossroads (Madeira Park, B.C.: Harbour, 1993).
132 The Royal Commission addressed these problems in the recommendations for Crown
forest resources: see Restructuringthe Relationship,supra note 5 at 641-42, where the Commission
recommended that:
The following steps be taken with respect to Aboriginal access to forest resources on
Crown lands:
(a) the federal government work with the provinces, the territories, and Aboriginal
communities to improve Aboriginal access to forest resources on Crown lands;
(b) the federal government, as part of its obligation to protect traditional Aboriginal
activities on provincial Crown lands, actively promote Aboriginal involvement in
provincial forest management and planning; as with the model forest program, this
would include bearing part of the costs;
(c) the federal government, in keeping with the goal of Aboriginal nation building, give
continuing financial and logistical support to Aboriginal peoples' regional and
national forest resources associations;
(d) the provinces encourage their large timber licensees to provide for forest
management partnerships with Aboriginal firms within the traditional territories of
Aboriginal communities;
(e) the provinces encourage partnerships or joint ventures between Aboriginal forest
operating companies and other firms that already have wood processing facilities;
(f) the provinces give Aboriginal people the right of first refusal on unallocated Crown
timber close to reserves or Aboriginal communities;
(g) the provinces, to promote greater harmony with generally less intensive Aboriginal
forest management practices and traditional land-use activities, show greater
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such as stream water quality, habitat, soils, or aesthetics are largely
ignored.

In recognition of these problems, many Aboriginal peoples are
struggling with the gap between traditional values of forest use, and the
reality of industrial tenures and logging. Some are attempting to address
the question of how to incorporate Aboriginal title rights into modern
forest management. As is demonstrated in Parts III(A)-(C), below, most
Aboriginal peoples are discovering that this is not possible under the
present tenure system, and may be difficult even when treaties are

settled. This Part discusses existing Aboriginal involvement in forest
management, both under the current tenure system and through
proposed treaty settlements.
A. Contracts
Contracts are entered into between bands or Aboriginal-run
companies and the government or forestry corporations for a variety of
forest management activities. First Nations provide the labour and, in
some cases, the equipment, and the company or government dictates
how the contract will be carried out. A First Nation has little scope to
alter the activity as the planning has already been completed when the
contracts are bid upon. The contractee simply undertakes an activity for
an industrial tenure holder.
Contracts with the Ministry of Forests include activities such as
silviculture, stand management, and firefighting.13 3 Contracts with

(h)

(i)

flexibility in their timber management policies and guidelines; this might include
reducing annual allowable cut requirements and experimenting with lower
harvesting rates, smaller logging areas and longer maintenance of areas left
unlogged;
provincial and territorial government make provision of a special role for Aboriginal
governments in reviewing forest management and operating plans within their
traditional territories; and
provincial and territorial governments make Aboriginal land-use studies a
requirement of all forest management plans.

133 For example, the Siwash Silviculture Company is run by the five bands of the Fraser
Canyon Indian Administration. For the past ten years, First Nation members have been employed
on planting and spacing contracts for the Ministry of Forests and local forest companies. The
Aboriginal supervisor was trained at the Nicola Valley Institute of Technology, and is now
responsible for the training and management of the First Nations' crews. Likewise, Cariboo Indian
Enterprises Ltd. is owned by fifteen bands in the Williams Lake area. Under an agreement with the
federal and provincial governments it manages the 41,000 hectare Chilcotin Military Block of the
Department of National Defence: see Task Force on Native Forestry, Native Forestry in British
Columbia:A New Approach FinalReport (Victoria: Task Force on Native Forestry, 1991) at 60-61
[hereinafter New Approach FinalReport].
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logging corporations span a spectrum. of industry activities from logging
1 34
to processing.
B. Joint Ventures
Joint ventures are logging and forest management initiatives
undertaken by corporations and First Nations as partners. Each party
contributes capital for the development of the venture. The benefits of
joint ventures for First Nations are the training, industry experience, and
economic development that accompanies the venture.135 However, such
initiatives operate within the existing forest land holding system, which
does not allow ecosystem-based management. Joint ventures usually
involve industrial logging and processing required by specific logging

tenures.
The Carrier Sekani Tribal Council attempted to reconcile
traditional values with extractive logging in a proposal for a joint
venture.1 36 The Council drafted a forest management plan, the focus of

which was to generate employment through the harvest and processing
of many different forest resources in addition to trees. Sensitive areas
were to be protected, and logging practices tailored to each ecological
area. All members of the Council were to participate in planning and
forest use. The Ministry of Forests rejected the plan as being too
difficult to administer and uneconomical. The Council then chose to
pursue economic development through a joint venture.1 3 7 There is now
134 Since 1943, Cheslakee Logging Ltd. has cut timber on the Cheslakee reserve and Crown
lands at the mouth of the Nimpkish River, British Columbia. Under contract to Canadian Forest
Products, the Company carries out stump-to-dump logging, and operates a shake and shingle mill in
the Fraser Valley: see ibid. at 59.
135 For example, the Burns Lake Development Corporation owns 10 per cent of Babine
Forest Products located on the Burns Lake Reserve in British Columbia. Since 1974, the
Corporation has been operating a modem sawmill and planermill. Weldwood Canada and Eurocan
Pulp and Paper are the other partners. The First Nation has one seat on the management
committee and over 32 per cent (70 jobs) of the workforce. Almost 80 per cent of the jobs held by
First Nation's members are operator or trades positions, and 50 per cent of these employees have
worked at the mill for ten years or more: see ibid
136 Interview with R. Michel, member of the Stellaquo Nation, President of Ne-Du-Chun
Forest Company (31 October 1995).
137 The Stellaquo, Nadleh and Stoney Creek Bands formed Ne-Du-Chun Forest Company
and obtained a licence to cut 400,000 cubic metres over eight years. The Company entered into a
joint venture with Slocan Forest Products and Vanderhoof Specialty Wood in 1990 to build and
operate a mill as Dezti Wood Company. The mill will produce laminated door stock, wood pellets
for stoves, and posts for Japanese housing. The 58 employees at the mill and 18 others involved in
harvesting will all be First Nations' members. Ne-Du-Chun retains a 51 per cent controlling interest.
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conflict within the community because of the method and rate of logging
on traditional lands. Some First Nation members agreed to the joint
venture solely because of the employment potential and with an
understanding that the logging would be carried out in a sensitive
manner using horses.
Examples exist as well of the Ministry of Forests refusing to
approve plans developed by an existing tenure holder, following
Aboriginal rights consultation with a First Nation. In 1992, the Kitwanga
Lumber Company and the Houses of the Lax'skiik (Eagle Clan) of the
Gitxsan Nation signed an agreement whereby Kitwanga agreed not to
log in the House's traditional area while the parties negotiated. 138 Clan
members in turn agreed to provide information about the land and their
exercise of Aboriginal rights, and to remove a road blockade. The
purpose of the negotiations was to develop a more comprehensive plan
for non-timber resources in Lax'skiik territory. The House of the
Lax'skiik and other clans mapped trapping, hunting, and fishing areas,
riparian zones, and other sensitive areas. Different types of logging,
typically horse logging and other low-impact methods, were identified
for different areas, and the Houses approved the plans. The Ministry of
the Environment reviewed the plan and cited it as a role model for
future forests.1 3 9 The Ministry of Forests did not comment on the plan
for two years (usually a two-month process) and, in 1994, refused to
approve it without significant revisions. The Ministry found that the selfimposed restrictions regarding the volume and methods of logging
exceeded the requirements of the Kispiox Resource Management Plan
and the Forest Practices Code "to such an extent as to seriously reduce
the operable land base and thus impact [the] wood supply over time."140

138 The information regarding this initiative was taken from correspondence between the
parties and the Ministry of Forests. Kitwanga Lumber Company was a small, locally owned licensee
operating in and around Gitxsan territory since the 1950s. Kitwanga had the rights to Forest
Licences A-1 6919 and A-I 6833.
139 In a letter from Leonard Vanderstar, Forest Ecosystem Specialist, British Columbia
Ministry of the Environment to F. Philpot, Consulting Forester for Kitwanga Lumber Co. Ltd.
(undated) [on file with authors], Vanderstar stated:
The TCP [Total Chance Plan] is thorough and well thought out, taking into consideration
a multitude of resource values. I [would] like to congratulate you and your respective
company clients for an excellent TCP. I feel that this plan will serve as a role model for
our future forests. The plan illustrates the compatibility of timber extraction with
maintenance of wildlife habitat, recreational opportunities, and recognition of local
culture.
The local environmental group, the Seven Sisters Society, also gave qualified support for the plan.
140 Letter to L.A. Hobenshield and F. Philpot, Kitwanga Lumber Company Limited, from
George Burns, Operations Manager, Kispiox Forest District (22 June 1994) [on file with authors].
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Appeals to the regional manager, the chief forester, and the minister of
forests were also unsuccessful.1 41
The experiences of the Carrier Sekani Tribal Council and the
Gitxsan Nation are examples of the difficulty that Aboriginal peoples
face with the existing forest tenure system. Government tenures are too
narrowly focused on volume production to allow Aboriginal peoples to
incorporate ecological and cultural values into forest management.
When one such plan was developed, even with the approval of the
tenure holder in the proposed area, the Ministry of Forests rejected the
venture because it compromised production objectives. Instead,
Aboriginal peoples are forced to severely compromise Aboriginal title
rights for economic development on traditional lands. The Carrier
Sekani Tribal Council is seeking an Aboriginal tenure under the
provincial system and settlement of their land claims. Their vision of
tenure would reconcile economic development and traditional values.l 42
The Gitxsan are advocating a treaty settlement that would include joint
tenure of their entire traditional lands, in keeping with their vision of the
Delgamuukw decision, as discussed below.
C. Crown Tenures1 43
Aboriginal peoples have traditionally found it difficult to access
the existing forestry tenure system. They lack the resources needed to
operate on the scale dictated by the government, and proposals that
have attempted to incorporate Aboriginal rights and ecosystem-based
management have been rejected. The experience of the Kluskus Band of
the central interior of British Columbia illustrates this difficulty. Since
1976, the Kluskus have attempted to secure a forest tenure on their
traditional lands. The band developed a forest management plan

141 In 1995, Kitwanga Lumber Company was taken over by Repap Enterprises Inc., and
subsequently Skeena Cellulose, a large industrial pulp and paper company that is now insolvent.
142 Under the proposed tenure, elders would determine the location, method, and subject of
any logging. The use of the selection method of logging would be the norm, and sensitive areas
would be avoided. Cutting and harvest would include valuable trees and traditional plants. The
scope of the harvest would be broadened to include birch and alder bark, and medicinal plants. The
scope of forest users would be broadened to all Council members. Clearcuts would be limited to
small areas subject to beetle kill, fire bums, and improperly managed second growth. Employment
and training are the priority, with horse logging and the use of smaller scale technology being
favoured: interview with R. Michel, supra note 136.
143 For ease of reference, British Columbia forestry tenures have been used here as examples
of Crown tenures.
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focused on limited logging that protected primary sustenance activities
and potential tourism values. In the late 1980s, the Kluskus applied for a
TFL, but were rejected. They subsequently refused an offer for a five-year
timber licence on the basis that such a tenure would not adequately
protect non-logging forest values. 144
Tree Farm Licence 42 is the sole TFL tenure held by a First
Nation in British Columbia. In 1981, the TI'azt'en Nation incorporated
Tanizul Timber to acquire the TFL that corresponds with their traditional
lands.145 More than one-half of the eighty jobs associated with operating
the TFL are held by First Nation members, with the goal that eventually
Tl'azt'en members will manage all aspects of the business1 46 However,
those involved in the venture have found that it is difficult to incorporate
both social and business objectives.147 Some members of the community
assert that the provincial volume-driven regime is in conflict with other
community forest uses and with the Tl'azt'en Elders' view of holistic
management, or their view of Aboriginal title.14 8 Trapping output has
decreased, and increased road access has resulted in more recreational
hunters using the Tl'azt'en traditional lands. The Nation members are
struggling with the contradictions inherent in industrial forestry: they try
144

See NAFA Submission, supranote 4 at 16.
145 The T was awarded to Tanizul Timber in 1982 and provides for 120,000 cubic metres per
yean see ibid. at 20. Tanizul Timber is overseen by an elected Board of six members who hold the
shares in trust for the community. The Board, "appointed by the community and held accountable
by the community, oversee the development of the company for the people": Chief E. John,
President of Tanizul Timber, interviewed in J. Kosek, "Ethics, Economics and Ecosystems: Can
B.C.'s Indigenous People Blend the Economic Potential of Forest Resources with Traditional
Philosophies?" (1993) 17:1 Cultural Survival Q. 19 at 23.
Tanizul Timber's forest management objectives are to:
" provide a stable employment base and job training close to home;
" contribute to the social and economic benefits of the Nation through intensive
integrated management of the TFL; and
" formally involve the community to exercise some control over land-use decisions
that affect traditional uses such as hunting, trapping, gathering and fuelwood
collection. Profits are invested back into the company.
See A. Hopwood, The Social and Economic Returns From Investments in Forest Management
Programson Indian Lands-Two Case Examples: FRDA Report 49 (Vancouver: Forestry Canada,
1988) at 19.
146 See Hopwood, supranote 145 at 27. The two main logging companies contracting with the
TI'azt'en are owned by First Nation members. The TI'azt'en have used federal job creation and
training projects to prepare members for employment with Tanizul Timber and other contractors in
the area. In the first five years of operation, ninety First Nation members participated: ibid. at 22.
147 See H. Nathan, "Aboriginal Forestry: The Role of the First Nations" in Drushka, Nixon &
Travers, eds., supra note 131, 146.
148 See the comments of Thomas Pierre, General Manager, Tanizul Timber, as quoted in
NAFA Assessment, supranote 84 at 13; and Restructuringthe Relationship,supra note 5 at 639.
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to value ecosystem integrity in their logging practices, but if they do not
log according to the annual allowable cut calculations set by the Ministry
of Forests they will lose the TFL.
Aboriginal peoples in other provinces are experiencing similar
difficulties. The Meadow Lake Tribal Council in Saskatchewan became
partners with the local sawmill employees in the late 1980s to form
NorSask Forest Products.149 NorSask purchased the mill and took over a
forest management licence agreement (FMLA) for 3.3 million hectares of
forest in northern Saskatchewan150 However, the venture has been less
beneficial than anticipated. Only 20 per cent of the logging is done by
the Meadow Lake Tribal Council Logging Company, and all forestry and
technical staff are non-Aboriginal. First Nations in the FMLA are
concerned about the effect logging is having on hunting, trapping, and
fishing. In fact, one of the longest running road blockades in Canadian
history was mounted by Tribal Council members protesting the adverse
impact on traditional berry-gathering, hunting, and trapping.IS1
These examples clearly illustrate the inadequacy of the industrial
tenure system for Aboriginal peoples. Capital-intensive, large-scale
forestry is required. There is no opportunity for First Nations to manage
traditional lands based on ecosystem principles that value the forests for
more than the logs that can be extracted from them. When First Nations
have attempted to incorporate Aboriginal rights into forest management
planning, their proposals have been rejected. The requirements attached
to corporate tenures force First Nations to log in culturally and
environmentally sensitive areas. Finally, corporate tenures are not
conducive to multiple forest uses and users. Timber production is
mandated, and the volume of trees cut usually precludes the viability of
other activities. The Model Forests program has attempted to address
many of these problems.

149 See M. Poffenberger, ed., Communities and Forest Management in Canadaand the United
States-A Regional Profile of the IUCN Working Group on Community Involvement in Forest
Management (Berkeley: Working Group on Community Involvement in Forest Management, 1998)
at 62; and NAFA Submission, supra note 4 at 21.

150 This licence was assigned to a new firm, Mistic Management, which is 49 per cent owned
by NorSask: see National Aboriginal Forestry Association, "Good Investments by Meadow Lake

Tribal Council" (1995) 3:1 National Aboriginal Forestry Association Newsletter 4.
151 The management company has established four forestry advisory boards to address
conflicts between logging plans, and hunting and trapping activities. The boards have the power to
restrict management plans; however, the province ultimately controls logging requirements. For a
detailed review of this situation, see T. Beckley & D. Korber, "Clearcuts, Conflict and Co-

management: Experiments in Consensus Forest Management in Northwest Saskatchewan" (1996)
[unpublished, archived at Northern Forestry Centre, Edmonton].
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D. Model Forests

The Department of Natural Resources Canada is managing the
implementation of eleven model forests in eight provinces across
Canada. 52 One of the original purposes of the program, established in
1992, was to expedite sustainable development in forestry through
integrated resource management, innovative management techniques,
and the demonstration of sustainable forestry practices.153 First Nations
involvement in the model forests is concentrated in the area of planning.
Inventories of current and historical cultural activities will be developed
on traditional lands. The only Aboriginal Model Forest is the Waswanipi
Cree Model Forest in Quebec, established in 1997. After intense
industrial forestry in the 1980s, the Waswanipi now manage a portion of
their traditional territory for both timber and non-timber values using
their traditional knowledge and land management system. 15 4
While legislative or policy constraints to integrated resource
management are dealt with through conflict resolution mechanisms,
there is no change in tenure. Likewise, no specific sustainability criteria
are required. These problems are heightened by the short-term time
frame for the program. The effectiveness of any model forest rests on
the extent to which each of the parties will modify their rights to
accommodate other interests. Nevertheless, here too each party operates
within the framework of existing rights under the regulatory regime. A
single model forest may be subject to Aboriginal rights, parks act
regulation, logging tenures, and wildlife regulations. There is no unifying

152 The model forests include the Long Beach and McGregor Model Forests in British

Columbia; the Foothills Model Forest in Alberta; the Prince Albert Model Forest in Saskatchewan;
the Manitoba Model Forest; the Eastern Ontario and Lake Abitibi Model Forests in Ontario; the
Waswanipi Cree and Bas-St-Laurent Model Forests in Quebec; the Fundy Model Forest in New
Brunswick; and the Western Newfoundland Model Forest: see Natural Resources Canada, The
Backgrounder:The CanadianModel Forest Program (Ottawa: Natural Resources Canada, 1997).

153 Any group that has an interest in the geographical area selected for the model forest, such
as First Nations, industry, and the federal and provincial governments may become involved.
Funding for five years of $100 million was provided from the federal government's Partners in
Sustainable Development of Forests Program (Green Plan). Sites were selected for their cultural
and ecological values. The forests are managed for wildlife, watershed, recreational, and fisheries
values, as well as for timber extraction: see Canada, Model Forests: Program Overview (Ottawa:
International Model Forest Secretariat, 1994); and E. Kovacs, "Model Forest Program Reflects
Cultural Values of Native People" Anishinabek News (September 1993) 9.
154 See Poffenberger, ed., supra note 149 at 64.
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goal or interest between the parties that will prevent a party from relying
on existing legal rights if such rights can be challenged.ISS
IV. COMMUNITY CONTROLLED FORESTS: THE
ELUSIVE VALUATION OF TRADITION
All of the above initiatives offer limited benefits to Aboriginal
peoples, and are a severe curtailment of the rights defined in the
Delgamuukw decision. As seen from the American examples, a model
tenure for Aboriginal peoples is one in which First Nations would be
able to act with relative autonomy-on the one hand building on
traditional practices while, on the other hand, ensuring ecosystem
protection-to create a culturally and environmentally prescribed forest
management scheme that is not subject to the pressures of the current
forestry model. To do this, First Nations require control of a substantial
portion of traditional lands that is still biologically intact. Only through a
permanent tenure of traditional lands can community control and
resources be built.
A. Co-management of TraditionalLands
Many First Nations across Canada are already governed by
treaty settlements that do not include control of traditional lands.
Generally, Aboriginal peoples must rely on existing Aboriginal rights to
influence forest management in traditional areas; however, Aboriginal
peoples assert that they have treaty rights over traditional lands and, at a
minimum, expect to be involved in forest management. Co-management

155 One example of Aboriginal involvement in the program is the Lake Abitibi Model Forest
in Northeastern Ontario. The Wahgoshig, New Post (Quebec), and Abitibiwinni (Quebec) First
Nations, as well as Abitibi-Price Inc., the Ministry of Natural Resources, and eleven other local
groups are involved. The focus is on mapping traditional land use sites to be used when planning
forest activities. Another example is the Mohawk Council of Akwesasne's involvement in the
Eastern Ontario Model Forest to create inventories of old growth white pine "Grandfather Trees"
that are used for genetic stock. In an October 1995 NAFA workshop, First Nations reviewed their
experiences with the Model Forests Program and found that with the existing tenure system and
jurisdiction over land use decisions remaining unchanged, Aboriginal peoples have no greater
access to resources, nor is there a greater recognition of Aboriginal rights. They concluded that the
Program perpetuates the status quo: see National Aboriginal Forestry Association, Workshop Report
on AboriginalParticipationin Canada'sModel ForestProgram (Ottawa: National Aboriginal Forestry
Association, 1996) at 6. In October 1996, Natural Resources Canada announced the continuation of
the Model Forests Program, which will include a component developed and managed by First
Nations.
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offers one approach to management conflicts in traditional areas. Comanagement has been defined as "the sharing of power and
responsibility between government and local resource users."1 56
Aboriginal peoples view co-management as joint decisionmaking that
reflects government-to-government relationships, and not as a substitute
for self-government.15 7 Co-management involves the integration of local
and state management systems, and, in theory, authentic comanagement involves sharing control over traditional lands. Influence
over management is held equitably by the parties. Conflicts between
logging and other uses should be reconcilable. Co-management may be
used to implement land claims settlements and treaties, and as a means
of interpreting existing treaty rights in a contemporary way.158
Some First Nations advocate treaty settlements that are based on
a co-management model. For example, the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en
Nations have taken the position that the only way they can preserve their
traditional forms of government and culture is through a form of comanagement of their entife traditional territory.1 59 They are not willing
to give up part of their traditional territory through a "land selection"
method of treaty settlement. Land selection would result in forfeiture of
most of their traditional area, and the kinship groups attached to that
land would no longer have traditional economic, cultural, and
governance rights.160 Co-management of the entire traditional lands
would, at the least, retain cultural stability within the Nation, and give
effect to the Delgamuukw decision's affirmation of Aboriginal laws and
social regulation. These First Nations chose this position as a
compromise between the land selection model and a treaty settlement
156 C. Notzke, "Aboriginal Peoples and Natural Resources: Co-Management, the Way of the
Future?" (1993) 9 National Geographic Research & Exploration 395.
157 See National Aboriginal Forestry Association, Presentation on Co-Management 4 the
NationalAboriginalForestryAssociation to the Standing Committee on AboriginalAffairs and Northern
Development, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee, Issue No. 30 (8
December 1994) at 27 [hereinafter NAFA Presentation].
158 Ibid. at 29.
159 Interview with R. Overstall, Lands and Resources Officer, Gitxsan Nation (17 July 1996).
See also F. Cassidy, ed., Aboriginal Title in B.C.: Delgamuukw v. The Queen (Lantzville, B.C.:
Oolichan Books & Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1992); and N.J. Sterritt et al., Tribal
Boundaries in the Nass Watershed (Vancouver: Univesity of British Columbia Press, 1998) at 15-97.
160 In the words of Hereditary Chief Satsan (Herb George) in Cassidy, ed., supra note 159 at
54-55:
We don't want to become brown white people accepting a different history, adopting a
pan-culture. We want to be who we are .... [T]he bottom line for us is to maintain our
identity as Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en people, to retain our history, to retain our culture,
our tradition, our spirituality, and our respect for one another, our respect for the land.
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that would grant them control of their entire traditional area. Currently,
however, the provincial government-which has a strict policy that treaty
negotiations will be conducted only on a land selection basis,161 not on a
co-management model. In the past, the province has broken off
negotiations with the Gitxsan over this issue. 162
An interesting initiative is taking place in the Nuu-Chah-Nulth
traditional territory in and around Clayoquot Sound, British Columbia.
After intense negotiations between the provincial government and the
Central Region Tribes, the Central Region Board (cRB) was established
in 1994 to coordinate all planning and management activities in the
Sound pending treaty settlement.1 63 The CRB has been superimposed
onto the existing tenure rights and Aboriginal rights. In practice, the CRB
reviews all decisions made by governments that affect land use in
Clayoquot Sound. Key features of the CRB'S role are an ecosystem-based
management approach, quasi decisionmaking power, and the integration
of traditional ecological knowledge into planning. The CRB is charged
with, among other things, balancing long-term sustainable forest use and
the short-term economic interests of local communities. The CRB is
mandated to act by double majority, which involves a majority of the
Board and a majority of the Aboriginal representatives. However, the
first decision made by the CRB was to operate by consensus, and all
decisions in its five years of operation to date have been by consensus. In
its planning decisions, the CRB attempts to balance the scientific and
cultural findings of the Scientific Panel for Sustainable Forest Practices
in Clayoquot Sound. 164

161 See B.C. Approach, supra note 99.
162 See S. Bell, "B.C. Gives Up On Gitxsan Treaty Talks" The Vancouver Sun (2 February
1996) Al at A9; and "Province Walks from the Treaty Table" Kahtou News (March 1996) at 10.
163 The CRB was established under the Interim Measures Agreement (IMA) of 1994. It is made
up of five representatives appointed by the Central Region Chiefs, five provincial representatives
appointed from the local area, an Aboriginal co-chair, and a cabinet-appointed co-chair. The CRB
may carry out monitoring as to whether or not the government has met its fiduciary obligation to
protect Aboriginal rights within Clayoquot Sound. Any resource management or land-use planning
decision of any ministry or agency dealing with forestry, aquaculture, land tenure, and wildlife
management must be reported to the cRB: see online: Central Region Board Planning Committee
<www.island.net/-tofino/ncrbp.htm> (date accessed: 27 April 2000); and Central Region Board
<www.island.net-tofino/ncrb.htm> (date accessed: 27 April 2000).
164 The Scientific Panel for Sustainable Forest Practices in Clayoquot Sound consisted of
three First Nations' elders and fifteen scientists charged with the task of making recommendations
for sustainable management in the Sound. In March 1995, the Panel produced a three-volume
report on forestry. The focus of the reports is on sustainable ecosystem management in partnership
with the Nuu-Chah-Nulth Nation. Recommendations include incorporation of traditional ecological
knowledge into planning, co-management based on equal partnership and mutual respect, research,
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Paralleling the CRB process is the Clayoquot Sound Planning
Committee, which the provincial government established to implement
the Scientific Panel recommendations. Charged with the task of
producing watershed-level plans in accordance with the Scientific Panel,
the sixteen-member community-based committee is made up of CRB and
government representatives.1 65 The complexity and uniqueness of this
arrangement cannot be understated: existing industrial tenures have had
superimposed onto them CRB authority and a community land use
planning process all within the context of radical, scientifically- and
culturally-based Scientific Panel reports.
The effectiveness of the CRB depends on its ability to operate
within existing governance structures. Some parties view the CRB as
having an advisory role to recommend approval, modification, or
rejection of a government decision. Aboriginal People view the CRB as a
decisionmaking body. The CRB has been operating for five years, and the
government has accepted all of its recommendations. 66 However, the
legitimacy of the CRB depends upon the tenuous interaction between the
parties and a weakening political goodwill. Specifically, proposed
amendments to TFL 44 in Clayoquot Sound, the new Interim Measures
Extension Agreement (IMEA), and the mandated joint venture
corporation demonstrate some positive and negative aspects of comanagement within an existing corporate tenure regime, as discussed
below.
Proposed amendments to the government-tenured TFL 44 in
Clayoquot Sound entrench CRB authority and the recommendations of
the Clayoquot Sound Scientific Panel in the TFL. The licensee logging
company is required to respect the new IMEA between the HawaiiH of
and full consultation and participation of the Nuu-Chah-Nulth in planning and decisionmaking
processes. A key recommendation is that hahuulhi, the tenure system of hereditary ownersh)p and
stewardship of the Nuu-Chah-Nulth, be recognized when planning and implementing ecosystem
management in traditional territories. The CRB, government, Nuu-Chah-Nulth, MacMillan Bloedel,
International Forest Products, and two of the local TFL holders have all accepted the Scientific
Panel's reports. MacMillan Bloedel is implementing area-based management whereby the inventory
and planning for an area are conducted with the overarching goal of maintaining ecosystem
integrity. From these plans, the volume of timber to be extracted, if any, is then calculated.

165 First Nations are represented through their involvement on the CR1 as the Planning
Committee is composed of the CRB and representatives from the provincial government. See online:
Central Region Board Planning Committee <www.island.net/-tofino/ncrbp.htm> (date accessed:
27 April 2000); and interview with L. Jones, Co-chair, Planning Committee and Clayoquot
Implementation Coordinator, Ministry of Environment, Lands and Parks (6 October 1997).
166 Interview with R. McMillan, former Co-chair, Central Region Board (14 April 1997).
Agreement between the CRB and provincial government can be negotiated, for example, as was the
case with the structure of the Clayoquot Sound Planning Committee mandated by the Scientific
Panel: interview with L. Jones, supra note 165.
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the Nuu-Chah-Nulth Central Region Tribes and Province of British
Columbia dated 24 April 1996, which has a three-year duration. 167 The
licensee is mandated to cooperate with and respect the authority,
responsibilities, operations, and objectives of the Central Region Board,

as set out in the IMEA. 168 The licensee is also required to implement the
findings of the Clayoquot Sound Scientific Panel, and "support the CRB,

the communities of Clayoquot Sound and those communities that rely
on economic activities in Clayoquot Sound in their efforts to increase
local employment, economic opportunities and community stability
through the use and development of the forest resources in Clayoquot
Sound ... ."169 Finally, under clause 7.11 the activities of the licensee as

specified in this amendment will be reviewed by the CRB and the Crown
on an annual basis.
The amendments are a radical departure from the usual practice
of ignoring cultural and biological values in forest management. This is
the first example of the use of local knowledge, cultural values,
community needs, and independent scientific study to define the
operation of an existing corporate tenure. By applying ecosystem-based
management principles, forest practices under the TFL can be tailored to
the local ecosystem and the needs of the local Aboriginal communities.
This re-orients the export-based multinational corporate forestry
167 See Clayoquot Sound Interim Measures ExtensionAgreement (26 April 1996) at 2 [on file
with authors]. Generally, the Interim Measures Agreements address dispute resolution mechanisms
for resource management conflicts. The IMEA
was valid from 1996 until April 1999, and is under
renegotiation for renewal. It deals with economic opportunities, training, and the development of
two cooperative forests pending treaty settlement. The seemingly contradictory goals of the NuuChah-Nulth to develop a tribal park in Clayoquot Sound, and of the British Columbia government
to manage the public lands and natural resources in the Sound in keeping with the purpose of the
iMEA, are recognized in the preamble of the IMEA. The intention of the IMEA is to "conserve
resources for future generations by incorporating the Scientific Panel recommendations, and its
acceptance and recognition of traditional ecological knowledge." Under the IMEA, the parties agree
that logging will continue, in accordance with the Scientific Panel recommendations, the Forest
Practices Code, and the Clayoquot Sound Planning Process. The Planning Process is one being
established in accordance with the Scientific Panel recommendations.
168 See ProposedAmendments to TFL 44 Regarding Clayoquot Sound (23 May 1996) [on file
with authors]. Specifically, in section 7.04, the licensee shall respect and promote initiatives in the
areas of treaty settlement and the expansion of land and resource base for First Nations; alienation
of land or water resources; reduction of the 70 per cent unemployment levels within Clayoquot
Sound; diversification for communities; provision of a viable, sustainable forest industry; and an
increase in local ownership within the forest industry.
169 Ibid., s. 7.10. MacMillan Bloedel has already agreed, outside of the proposed amendments,
to implement the Scientific Panel's recommendations and to work with the CRB. The amendments
have not beep ratified because the licensee disagrees with one clause that would require it to give
one-year notification to local communities and workers in the event of a change in the TFL:
interview with R. McMillan, supranote 166.
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structure by forcing industry to react to local concerns. However, it is
important to examine the structural effect of the amendments to TFL 44,
which institutionalizes co-management in the existing tenure structure.
In law, the parties' rights remain unchanged. The CRB relies on political
support. The Nuu-Chah-Nulth are not joint stewards of their traditional
lands, but parties in planning and joint ventures. Finally, ecosystembased management will significantly reduce the volume of timber cut,
which will adversely affect local communities unless transition strategies
are put in place.
While the CRB is seen as the primary vehicle for overall
management and final decisions, the First Nations of the Nuu-ChahNulth have retained the right to negotiate individually with the forest
tenure holders in their traditional territory. Indeed, the IMEA actually
requires the Nuu-Chah-Nulth to undertake a joint venture with
MacMillan Bloedel, the licensee of TFL 44. The IMEA provides that all
operations will comply with the Scientific Panel recommendations, the
IMEA, the ForestPractices Code, and CRB requirements. On 9 April 1997,
the Nuu-Chah-Nulth and MacMillan Bloedel announced their
agreement to form a joint venture forest company. The corporation,
Iisaak Forest Products Limited (Iisaak), is 51 per cent owned by the
Nuu-Chah-Nulth (through the Ma Mook Development Corporation),
and 49 per cent by MacMillan Bloedel, and will operate in the Clayoquot
Sound portion of TFL 44. Iisaak is committed to respecting the regulatory
approvals processes of the CRB, provincial and federal governments, and
the IMEA, and is committed to implementing the Scientific Panel. 7 0 The
Nuu-Chah-Nulth see this as an opportunity to "change forest
management and planning processes to provide more protection for
environmental and cultural values associated with the forests of
Clayoquot Sound, and ... to advance the economic interests of

Aboriginal people in relation to the forest industry."171
While it is easy to envision the conflicts that could be created by
a mandated merger that requires the use of a corporate structure for
First Nation-specific ecosystem-based management, the parties have
approached the development of Iisaak in the full spirit of the Scientific

170 See Central Region Nuu-Chah-Nulth First Nations and MacMillan Bloedel, Backgrounder
and Infonnation for News Media (Vaficouver: Central Region Nuu-Chah-Nulth First Nations &
MacMillan Bloedel, 1997) [hereinafter Backgrounderand Infonnation].
171 Larry Baird, Chief Councillor, Ucluelet First Nation, as quoted in Backgrounderand
Infonnation,ibid. at 2.
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Panel and community-based management.' 72 In developing the business
plan for Iisaak, the Nuu-Chah-Nulth have been crafting a management
structure that promotes community and ecosystem-based management.
At the core of the business plan are three strategies that bring the

benefits of forest management back into the community: (1)
management activities will be contractor-based; (2) the wood cut in
Clayoquot Sound will be offered to local businesses first; and (3)
management will include equal consideration of non-timber forest
values.1 73 As directed by the

IMEA

and in support of this approach, a

proposal has been submitted to the provincial government for the
transfer of the Clayoquot portion of TFL 44 to Iisaak.' 74
Recognizing that successful forest management requires a
resolution of outstanding conflicts, the Nuu-Chah-Nulth have also
brought all those interested in forest management in Clayoquot Sound
to the table, and have finalized two memoranda of understanding (Mou)

172 The conflicts envisioned relate to the fact that corporate goals are contrary to ecosystembased and cultural values. Corporations are driven first and foremost to manage for profits and
business growth. Indeed, they are legally mandated to do so: see British Columbia Company Act,
R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 62, s. 118; and the CanadianBusiness CorporationsAct, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, s. 122.
This is a serious constraint on the degree to which Aboriginal title and non-economic objectives can
be incorporated into corporate objectives. In the case of a joint venture corporation for Clayoquot
Sound, it is difficult to envisage Aboriginal People and MacMillan Bloedel shareholders working
toward the common goal of ecosystem-based management, without extensive governmental
subsidies.
173 See Ma Mook Development Corporation, Draft Briefing Notes: lisaak Forest Products
(Tofino, B.C.: Ma Mook Development Corporation, 1998) at I [hereinafter Draft Briefing Notes],
which states that the core business and management strategies of Iisaak include:
•
practicing non-industrial forestry;
* establishing management plans without a pre-determined annual allowable cut;
•
emphasizing value over volume;
" seeking premium markets for timber and/or products made from timber;
" supplying local value-added manufacturers;
* customizing operations to meet the needs of buyers interested in specialized
products produced from a company that is conducting commercial forest operations
based on an approach involving conservation, ecosystem management and First
Nations values;
" seeking new ways to manage forests that are part of the Clayoquot tenure on a
holistic basis for both timber and non-timber values; and
" working with Central Region First Nations to establish a First Nations Certification
for forest management that will be endorsed by the Forest Stewardship Council.
Operationally, a team has been engaged to develop an ecosystem-based management plan for
Clayoquot Sound. The focus will be on small-scale eco-forestry in developed watersheds, with
tourism and other non-timber uses in the pristine areas: interview with D. Paradis, Resource
Management Consultant, Ma Mook Development Corporation (10 March 1999).
174 See Draft BriefingNotes, supranote 173.
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to address these conflicts.1 75 The first is with five of the six
environmental groups historically involved in the area.17 6 The MOU
commits Iisaak to First Nations-driven, ecosystem-based management
with eventual third-party forest products certification from the Forest
Stewardship Council.177 At the same time, the environmental groups will
assist Iisaak with marketing its products or products originating from
Iisaak wood. The second MOU is with representatives of forest workers
and community interests in the Ucluelet area, who have been
traditionally dependent on the forest industry in Clayoquot Sound. This
MOU commits Iisaak to providing employment opportunities to workers
displaced by forest industry restructuring, after priority has been given to
Aboriginal individuals and businesses. These workers also have the
option to buy into Iisaak to a maximum of 10 per cent. In seeking to
address long-standing forest use conflicts, the intent of the two MOUS is
to create the political and economic stability necessary to attract
investment and new knowledge for the venture.
The broad ranging support for, and the development of, Iisaak's
management structure is unique. Iisaak challenges the corporate model
of forestry by implementing an ecosystem-based plan that manages for
both timber and non-timber values. It has also restructured the
relationships between all parties interested in forest preservation,
management, and production in Clayoquot Sound. Given a unique
opportunity, supported by institutional and operational flexibility at the
governmental and corporate (MacMillan Bloedel) levels, the Nuu-ChahNulth have created a radically different model for co-management.
Indeed, they see themselves as leaders in a new way of doing business.1 78
175

1bid.

176 The environmental groups include Greenpeace International, Greenpeace Canada,
Western Canada Wilderness Committee, Sierra Club, and the National Resources Defense Council.
Friends of Clayoquot Sound did not sign the MOu and have taken a position of neutrality.
177 Similar to the organic agriculture industry, the demand for "ecocertified" wood is
increasing as consumers ask for sustainably-produced products. The Forest Stewardship Council
guidelines specifically require forest management that safeguards indigenous land rights. The move
towards certified wood has been a major part of Greenpeace International's European campaign.
178
As is expressed in DraftBriefing Notes, supra note 173 at 2:
Iisaak recognizes that the idea of combining development of timber values with
development of non-timber values in a manner that will help pay for some of the costs of
enhanced conservation is an unusual, and some would say, radical notion in Canadian
forest circles. Iisaak recognizes that such an approach is beyond the practical experience
of any forest company, government agency, environmental group, or Aboriginal or local
community in Canada. Nevertheless, it is Iisaak's belief that its experience in Clayoquot
will lead to the emergence of an internationally recognized system of eco-forestry
uniquely designed to deal with the issue of conservation of pristine areas of primary

AboriginalForestry

1999]

If the shifting sands of political will in British Columbia can be steadied,
all eyes will be on this first ecosystem-based venture that changes both
existing tenurial and provincial rights.
In general, while co-management has meant some Aboriginal
involvement and input into planning processes and logging methods on
traditional lands, except in unique situations such as in Clayoquot
Sound, it falls short of a reallocation of tenure rights. For some
Aboriginal peoples, co-management may be a better option than having
no influence over forest management on traditional lands. However, comanagement has not equalled joint stewardship because Aboriginal
rights, including ecological and communal values, are not considered on
an equal basis with economic factors. Moreover, many Aboriginal
peoples continue to refuse to participate in co-management
arrangements for fear that they will compromise the treaty rights they
are in the process of negotiating. Co-management is, as yet, an imprecise
concept that does not address the fundamentals of community-based
power by redefining state power or altering existing tenure arrangement.
B. Reserve Land
In Canada, existing reserve land offers some First Nations viable
forest lands. Excluding reserves with less than 20 hectares, 85 per cent of
the bands in Canada on 1,172 reserves have forests totalling 1,122,000
hectares. There are 240 bands whose productive forest areas are larger
than 1,000 hectares. 179 In British Columbia, 196 bands on 1,613 reserves
cover 338,000 hectares. Of this, 50 per cent is classified by the Ministry
of Forests as productive forest land. This amounts to 0.3 per cent of the
provincial forest land base of 51.5 million hectares.18 0 Currently, the
prevailing focus of Aboriginal peoples is on reforestation of reserve
lands and the establishment of long-term management plans.lS' In
forest while allowing for new forms of sustainable development of timber and non-timber
values in a manner that will benefit local communities and other private and public
interests supporting these activities.
179 See C. Notzke, Aboriginal People and NaturalResources in Canada (North York, Ont.:

Captus University Press, 1994) at 86-87.
180 See New Approach FinalReport, supra note 133 at 7.

181 An example of this is the Woodlands in Keeping for Our Youth project (wIKY) on the
42,600 hectare Wikwemikong Unceded Indian Reserve #26 in Ontario. The goal of WIKY is to

"manage the forest resource to the optimum benefit of individual members and total Band

membership, addressing the environmental (and spiritual) concerns of the Band": see S. Harvey,
Ontario Community Forestry Pilot Project: Lessons Learned 1991-1994, Taking Stock of Ontario's
Community Forestry Experience (Toronto: Ministry of Natural Resources, 1995) at 60-61. The focus
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Ontario, some bands have joined together to work on coordinating land

management strategies, and rehabilitating reserve and treaty forests.' 82
Others are just beginning to develop ecologically- and culturallyprescribed forest management operations. 83 First Nations can have
control over the forest uses on reserves; however, historically poor

management by DIAND has left most reserve forests in a denuded state. 184
is on establishing policies and regulations to ensure long-term timber revenues, and allow for a
variety of forest uses. The community has developed and adopted by consensus a Tribal Policy on
Timber Resources. The Policy gives the Band authority to issue logging permits and establishes
some logging regulations. Other initiatives include the development of a land use plan, a timber
management plan, an updated forest resource inventory, and a community forest trust fund.
182 For example, the Lake Superior First Nations Trust (formerly the Mizhinawae Economic
Development Corporation, (MEDc)) represents seven bands in the Robinson-Superior Treaty Area
in Ontario. It was created in 1991 to address the lack of coordination between the bands for land
management. The Traditional Lands Technical Unit of MEDC is mapping the treaty area by
consulting with Elders and using a Gis system. Once the traditional area is mapped and existing
resources and values within those areas are defined, the community hopes to be more effective in
affecting decisions about resource management: interview with D. Mackett, Mizhinawae Economic
Development Corporation (23 November 1995).
183 For example, on the Wikwemikong unceded reserve on Manitoulin Island, the Chief and
Council have approved terms of reference and a mission statement to develop a strategy for a
diversified natural resource harvest, use, and regeneration of the forests. Forest plans are being
developed for the 42,000 hectare reserve: see Wickwemikong Unceded Indian Reserve Forestry
Department, Background Paper (Manitoulin Island, Ont.: Wickwemikong Unceded Indian Reserve,
1998).
184 See Restructuring the Relationship, supra note 5 at 633. The Royal Commission made
several recommendations in this regard at 634-35:
With respect to forest resources on reserves, the federal government take the following
steps:
(a) immediately provide adequate funding to complete forest inventories, management
plans and reforestation of Indian lands;
(b) ensure that adequate forest management expertise is available to First Nations;
(c) consult with Aboriginal governments to develop a joint policy statement delineating
their respective responsibilities in relation to Indian reserve forests;
(d) develop an operating plan to implement its own responsibilities as defined through
the joint policy development process;
(e) continue the Indian forest lands program, but modify its objectives to reflect and
integrate traditional knowledge and the resource values of First Nations
communities with objectives of timber production; and
(0 in keeping with the goal of Aboriginal nation building, provide for the delivery of
the Indian forest land program by First Nations organizations (as has been the case
with the Treaty 3 region of northwestern Ontario).
The Eel Ground First Nation is an example of a community attempting to address their degraded
reserve and traditional lands to provide multiple benefits. After years of overcutting by the Micmac
and others, the Chief and Council approached the Canadian Forest Services for assistance. Now,
with a management plan in place, the First Nation is focusing on rehabilitating 3,000 hectares of
both reserve and traditional lands. Non-timber values are incorporated into management, and
community participation is increasing. However, the First Nation is limited by its small reserve and
Crown land base, and attempts to gain more forest land from the Crown have failed: see M. 3etts,
"Community Forestry in New Brunswick" (1997) 12 Int'l J. Ecoforestry 247.

1999]

AboriginalForestry

In addition, most reserves are too small to support economically viable
forest activity that benefits more than a few band members.
In the United States, both the size of many reservations and the
legislative framework allows Aboriginal peoples to manage forests for a
diversity of uses and on a long-term basis. As a result, the Makah Tribe
of Washington State operates Makah Tribal Enterprises on their 12,875
hectare reservation. 8 5 The Makah are committed to flexible resource
management that can respond to different ecological and cultural
realities. All planning and activities are screened through a peer review
process where consultation is held with the fisheries and water quality
departments of the Makah, the tribal government, the museum, and the
community. Any conflicts with a proposal are resolved before it is
approved. For example, if a site study uncovers a traditional use site, the
museum, anthropologists, and community members decide whether or
not logging should be conducted on that site. This same approach is used
when an endangered species is discovered.
The Makah have the freedom to manage reservation lands
because they have opted for self-governance under the Tribal SelfGovernanceAct 186 and NIFRMA.187 The Makah have the authority to enact
their own regulations regarding resource management. At a minimum,
they comply with all federal laws, and assert that their practices are
stricter environmentally than the legislation requires. 88 The planning
and implementation of Tribal programs has been expedited by the
presence of an on-reservation Trust Officer from the BIA who directly
approves reservation management documents. The Makah assert that
while any BIA influence is not an ideal situation, this arrangement is
another step towards self-government. Through the use of the legislated
self-governance provisions, the Makah have developed a communitybased forest management regime that is flexible and able to adapt to the
ecological conditions on the reservation.

185 Interview with M. Dukes, supra note 124. There are 1,400 members who live on the

reservation. Of those, 52 are employed by the forest department, which cuts between 8 and 12
million board feet per year. Over fifteen years ago, 10 per cent of the old growth forest on the

reservation was set aside for cultural uses. The Makah rely on a continuous forest inventory on
which to base their ten-year resource management plans. All of the seedlings for silviculture

operations are grown on the reservation. The species composition of a site is determined before
logging and that same composition is replanted. In addition, cedar is planted widely throughout the
reservation because of its cultural significance.
186 Supra note 119.
187 Supra note 121.
188 Interview with M. Dukes, supra note 124.
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Perhaps the most well-known example of long-term tribal forest
management is that of the Menominee Indian Tribe in northeastern
Wisconsin. On the reservation of 105,380 hectares, in the last 140 years,
over two billion board feet of timber have been removed from the
Menominee Forest.1 8 9 Today, the volume of standing timber on the

reservation is greater than when it was established.190 As a matter of
tribal philosophy, the health of the whole forest is the basis for
management; the Menominee are unified in their cultural and economic
commitment to the forest.' 9 l Management of the forest is governed by a
twenty-year forest management plan, which is based on sustained yield
within the context of ecological maintenance.1 92 Menominee Tribal
Enterprises (MTE) develops the plan each year so that a twenty-year plan
is always in place.1 93 The plan is then reviewed by the tribal legislature
for approval. MTE also works closely with the tribal government to plan
for fish, wildlife, and other forest values. Traditional forest knowledge is
utilized, with the assumption that "without more information, we can
only look to the forest and see a healthy productive system and assume

189 See P. Huff & M. Pecore, "Menominee Tribal Enterprises: A Case Study" in Institute of
Environmental Studies and Land Tenure Centre, Case Studies of Community-Based Forestry
Enterprises in the Americas (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1995) 1. The annual
cut is 29 million board feet, of which one-half is processed on the reservation.
190 See D. Burgess, "Forest of the Menominee-A Commitment to Sustainable Forestry"
(1996) 72 Forestry Chronicle 268. The Menominee Reservation had an estimated 1.5 billion board
feet (7.1 million cubic metres) of saw-timber growing stock when it was established in 1854. Today
there is an estimated 1.7 billion board feet (8.1 million cubic metres). However, M. Pecore,
"Menominee Sustained-Yield Management: A Successful Land Ethic in Practice" 90:7 J. Forestry
12 at 16, takes a more conservative approach that the sawtimber stock is still at 1.5 billion board
feet.
191 Menominee members have the right "to hunt, fish, trap, and gather food from plants
subject only to those tribal laws which are necessary to conserve these natural resources of the tribe;
provided that this right shall not include the right to engage in commercial uses of such tribal
resources": Menominee Tribe of Wisconsin, 1967, as quoted in Huff & Pecore, supra note 189 at 6.
The harvesting of food on the reservation is not regulated, but a permit is needed to cut firewood
and other timber: see Poffenberger, ed., supra note 149 at 78.
192 Burgess, supra note 190, provides a detailed summary of the Menominee's current forest
practices. Representatives from the mA and the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources work
together in partnership with Menominee Tribal Enterprises (Mm) in the same office: see Pecore,
supra note 190 at 12. Mandatory minimum stocking levels must be met before any green, standing
timber can be harvested. Natural regeneration aided by scarification is the primary method used for
stand regeneration.
193 At the operational level, MTE is run by an elected board of twelve directors who set policies
and evaluate management results. The current board consists mostly of MTE employees.
Management employees have worked for MTE on average for twenty-two years, and mill employees
for thirteen years. Menominee Tribal Ordinance 82.10 dictates that qualified tribal members will be
hired first.
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that our history proves that what we are doing works."1 94 Areas within
the forest have been protected from logging activities because of their
religious significance, although the largest site is only forty acres. The
Menominee are a self-governing Nation and have the power to enact
laws and enforce them. Like the Makah, the Menominee have an onreservation BIA Trust Officer that makes the approval and
implementation of tribal activities more informal and expedient.
The forest is considered the pillar of the Menominee economy
with 400 people, 10 per cent of the on-reservation population, employed
in forest management and milling.' 95 MTE boasted a profit of $1.7 million
in 1993-1994. Critical to this profit is Menominee's sustainable "ecoforestry" approach that has allowed its products to be certified by two
independent ecological certifiers, Green Cross and Smartwood. MTE
attributes the health of the forest to its management focus both on the
whole forest cover rather than on a single species, and on the
Menominee's dependence on the forest ecosystem for cultural survival.
Despite their success, some questions about MTE'S approach
remain. First is the financial viability of MTE over the long term,
considering that the BIA provides $2.2 million each year to fund forest
management activities on the reservation as part of its trust
responsibility.196 Some herbicides are used in the forest. 197 Despite its
certification as an ecologically sustainable operation, there have not
been any ecosystem studies conducted for the Menominee Forest.
Finally, community participation in forest management is limited and
formal, with members either having to sit on the Board of MTE or go
194 Huff & Pecore, supra note 189 at 18. While

MTE

has extensive stand inventory, there is a

need to gather baseline ecosystem data.
195 Other examples of large forested reservations that have tribal forest enterprises include

the Navajo Forest Products Industries with its sawmill and particleboard plant, which has a 64
million board feet capacity. The Fort Apache Timber Company has a large-log and a small-log mill

with a 110 million board feet capacity (the largest tribally-owned forest products mill in the United
States). The Warm Springs Forest Products Industries has a 95 million board feet capacity
producing logs, lumber, studs, veneer, plywood, chips, and electric power. "In total, more than 40
per cent of the annual Indian timber-harvest volume is processed in tribal mills": R.W. Sassaman &

R.W. Miller, "Native American Forestry" (1986) 84:10 J. Forestry 26 at 31.
196 Interview with L. Waukau, President, Menominee Tribal Enterprises (15 November 1995),
who claimed that neighbouring state forests cost $37 per acre to manage while the Menominee
forests costs only $7 per acre.

197 According to Darwin Burgess, the use of herbicides is a controversial issue. Herbicides are
used to reduce competition against preferred species if necessary, but, since the Menominee forests

are managed on long rotations, the need for herbicide use is rare. Forest managers acknowledge
that new techniques are needed for natural regeneration that do not rely on herbicides nor reduce
biodiversity: see Burgess, supra note 190 at 273-75.
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through the tribal legislature. In this light, the president of MTE, Larry
Waukau, takes a sceptical view of community participation, commenting
that "the last thing you want to do is give business and economic
concerns to people solely concerned with tradition and culture."198
Notwithstanding these criticisms, MTE continues on the basis that their
logging methods and diverse forest canopy create a healthy ecosystem
with which the community has been satisfied for 140 years.) 99 While
community involvement appears to be formalized, the Menominee
attribute their success to community support of the cutting methods and
the control of overuse by other members. This is a concrete example of
combining traditional values with economic development.
These examples illustrate how a secure land base and flexible
governance structures can enable Aboriginal peoples to manage their
forests in a culturally and ecologically prescribed manner. Forest
management on reserve lands gives these American tribes relative
autonomy from the usual conflicting interests typical of traditional lands
in Canada. In contrast, in Canada, and notwithstanding the Delgamuukw
decision, little opportunity exists for Aboriginal peoples to obtain
comprehensive use of traditional lands. In British Columbia, however,
the promise of settlement lands is the main attraction for many First
Nations participating in the treaty process.
C. Treaties
The recent settlement of treaties, or the promise of treaty
settlement in British Columbia, offers a unique opportunity to
implement new ways of stewarding forests that can combine Aboriginal
title rights, ecological imperatives, and economic development.
However, the reality of recent treaty settlements results neither in the
creation of sustainable forest management nor in new forms of tenure.
This has been the case even with Nations that still have strong cultural
ties to the land.

198 Interview with L. Waukau, supra note 196. Waukau also commented that none of his
Board members have formal education and do not'have the knowledge of forestry that is needed to
run a business.
199 Forest health indicators include the ability of Menominee hunters to harvest one thousand
deer and one hundred bears each year- see Huff & Pecore, supra note 189 at 6.
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For example, many Cree of Eeyou Astchee (Northern Quebec)
maintain a traditional hunting and trapping lifestyle. 20 0 Each family has
a territory in which they practice animal stewardship. 201 The families
respond to biological indicators, such as fluctuations in animal
populations, and change their hunting and trapping practices to ensure
the continued viability of each species. In 1975, the Crees signed the
James Bay Northern Quebec Agreement when hydroelectric
development proceeded on their traditional land. The Agreement
confirmed their right to continue to rely on subsistence activities, and
codified their traditional hunting and trapping stewardship system. 20 2
However, the Crees assert that the provincial government is not
respecting these rights in several ways. Regional land use management
plans, as required by the Quebec ForestAct,203 are not being approved
prior to licensing of forestry activities. In addition, consultation with the
Crees on hunting and trapping areas has not been incorporated into
government operational or planning documents. 20 4 Today, five-year
management plans are being approved without twenty-five-year plans in
place, and the Ministry of Forests is apportioning land into forest
management units that do not correspond to Cree hunting and trapping
territories. 205 While the James Bay Northern Quebec Agreement
200 Over 1,200 families regularly use the 300 hunting territories in Eeyou Astchee: see G.

Quaile, Crees and Trees (Ottawa: Grand Council of the Crees, 1996) at 14 [hereinafter Crees and
Trees].
201 The biological history of the area is given to each generation along with the territory. This
oral tradition sets out annual harvesting cycles, as well as long-term population fluctuations. The
"tallyman" in each family would communicate ecosystem changes with other families to ensure that
they modified their use of the resource accordingly: see F. Berkes, "Environmental Philosophy of
the Chisasibi Cree People of James Bay" in M. Freeman & L. Carbyn, eds., TraditionalKnowledge
and Renewable Resource Management (Edmonton: Boreal Institute for Northern Studies, 1988) 7.
202 See F. Berkes, P. George & R. Preston, "Co-management: The Evolution in Theory and
Practice of the Joint Administration of Living Resources" (1991) 18:2 Alternatives 12 at 15.

203 S.Q. 1996, c. 108.
204 The Cree tallymen from Mistissini, Waswanipi, and Ouje Bougoumou participated in a
federal Resource Development Impact Program (RDIP), the purpose of which was to gather
information about significant hunting and spiritual areas to be used in a land use plan. However,
indigenous knowledge was not ultimately incorporated into the plans. In 1990, the Cree critiqued
the draft land use plan, but no revisions were made by the province before several long-term tenures
on traditional lands were awarded to forest companies: see Crees and Trees, supra note 200 at 10;
and interview with G. Quaile, Grand Council of the Cree of Quebec (15 September 1998).
205 The Cree retain full resource use rights over Category 1 lands, and hunting and trapping
rights in other Category lands. Under the Agreement, the James Bay Advisory Committee on the
Environment and Forest Committee of the Grand Council of the Cree were established: see NAFA
Submission, supra note 4 at 19. In addition, the Agreement exempted forestry activities on
traditional lands from class environmental assessment. Roads that are less than fifty kilometres were
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provides a procedural right that Cree activities may continue on their
traditional lands, in practice logging is severely impacting hunting and
trapping, while the Crees have no control over logging methods or
location. Alleging that their traditional way of life has been destroyed,
the Crees have launched a $500 million law suit against the Province of
Quebec and twenty-six forest companies. 206
Since the James Bay Northern Quebec Agreement, the most
recent treaty settlement to involve large tracts of forested land is that of
the Nisga'a Nation of Northwestern British Columbia. 207 The Nisga'a
negotiated 1,992 square kilometres of traditional territory in the lower
Nass Valley, on which the Nisga'a Government will own all forest
resources.2 08 On those lands the Nisga'a Government has law-making
and forest management authority, subject to the requirement to meet or
exceed provincial standards for Crown lands. 209 The Nisga'a may
establish harvesting and conservation standards in relation to non-timber
forest resources that meet or exceed relevant federal and provincial
legislation in relation to private land.210
This apparent flexibility in forest management is promising but,
in practice, it is undermined by historical conditions and government
regulation on the Nisga'a lands. The Nisga'a settlement lands have
largely been logged as part of TFL 1. In the rest of their traditional area,
they may have limited and indirect influence on forestry, through the
possible acquisition of forest tenures and through ad hoc representation
on fish and wildlife management boards. 211 Forest tenures in the
also exempted.

206 The action is not based solely on failure to consult, but breaches of "constitutional, treaty,
legal, statutory, and contractual duties": R. Seguin, "Crees Sue Over Clear-cut Logging" The Globe
and Mail (6 July 1998) A4.
207 In the interim, between the James Bay Agreement and the upcoming British Columbia
treaties, no new tenure types have been created either. There are, however, some co-management
arrangements such as in the Yukon.
208 See Nisga'aAgreement, supra note 11, c. 5, s. 3.
209 Ibid., c. 5, ss. 6, 8.Whether or not standards "meet or exceed" provincial standards is
judged by a subjective test that they be "no more intrusive to the environment than the forest
standards applicable to Crown land established under the forest practices legislation": ibid., c. 5, s.
10. It is unclear whether or not ecosystem-based management would be considered "no more
intrusive to the environment" than the current forestry regime.
210 Ibid., c. 5, s. 11.
211 "British Columbia agrees in principle to an acquisition by the Nisga'a Nation of a forest
tenure or tenures having an aggregate allowable annual cut of up to 150,000 metres cubed," with the
approval of the Minister of Forests, and once a public process has been undertaken: ibid., c. 5, s. 76.
Nisga'a representatives make up two of six members of the Joint Fisheries Management
Committee, who may make various recommendations to the Minister, and communicate with other
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traditional area come under Ministry of Forests regulation, and all
timber manufacturing will be subject to provincial rules and regional
policies respecting manufacturing in British Columbia.2 12 Participation
on management boards is largely advisory; at best, the Nisga'a will have

influence over forest management in the traditional area through the
impact on fish and wildlife.213 At worst, they will simply receive

information. 214

The transitional provision for forest resources in the Nisga'a

Agreement are also constraining. The Nisga'a and the province agreed
upon an allowable annual cut for Nisga'a lands that will apply for nine
years.215 In addition, laws of general application and Ministry of Forests
policies will apply to Nisga'a lands for five years, and the Nisga'a will not
establish a primary timber processing facility for ten years.21 6 These
conditions clearly indicate that the governments are more concerned
about minimizing the impacts to existing non-Aboriginal industrial

forestry interests than with fostering a new, ecologically-based
Aboriginal economy, the principles for which are outlined in
Delgamuukw.
What may have the most impact in the Nisga'a Agreement is the
establishment of a Nisga'a Lisims (central) Government. Given the
traditional House system of the Nisga'a, the Agreement does not simply
settle a "land" claim, but establishes a different governance structure for
the First Nation. Governance will be carried out by elected members of
the Nisga'a Lisims Government, and the Nisga'a Village Governments.
management or advisory bodies "in respect of matters of mutual interest": ibid., c. 8, ss. 77-82.
Likewise, the Wildlife Committee has similar advisory powers, and up to four of its nine members
may be Nisga'a. These provisions are in contrast to specific provisions in the older Agreement-inPrinciple, which provided for the Nisga'a Central Government to receive the same information
concerning forest development as is provided to other government agencies.
212 Ibid., c. 5, s. 65.
213 The Crown may authorize uses and dispose of Crown land, but such activities must not
deny Nisga'a citizens "the reasonable opportunity to harvest wildlife under Nisga'a wildlife
entitlements": ibid., c. 9,s. 3.
214 While the British Columbia and federal governments are required to consult with the
Nisga'a Nation, usually through the Wildlife Committee, prior to enacting regulations or policies
that significantly affect wildlife management or harvesting within the management area (see ibid., c.
9, s. 50), in the Nisga'a Agreement "consult" is defined in clause I to mean only:
•
notice of a matter to be decided, in sufficient detail to permit the party to prepare
its views on the matter;
" a reasonable period of time to permit the party to prepare its views on the matter;
•
an opportunity for the party to present its views on the matter; and
" a full and fair consideration of any views on the matter.
215 Ibid., c. 9,s. 17.
216 Ibid.. c. 9, ss. 5,70.
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This structure is based on the liberal democratic tradition, not on the
traditional laws of the Nisga'a. The implications of such a structure may
be profound for the First Nation. The First Nation is implementing an
agreement that defines its relationship with the province and its
traditional land, but neither promotes Nisga'a land, nor legal and social
institutions. The First Nation must adapt not only to new substantive
rights, but to a new governance structure as well.
The Nisga'a Agreement is the result of the First Nation seeking
certainty with respect to Nisga'a ownership and use of lands and
resources 2 17 As with many negotiations, it is a significant departure
from the Aboriginal title rights set out in Delgamuukw. Some members
of the Nisga'a view it as too much of a compromise. 218 The First Nation
relies upon the goodwill between the parties, based on a "new approach
to mutual recognition and sharing," 219 to give effect to the many
discretionary powers accorded different levels of government. However,
given Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal government relations to date and
the volume-driven approach to forestry in the Agreement, no apparent
protection exists for the Nisga'a's unique relationship with the forested
land. Indeed, in this post-Delgamuukw climate there is little indication
that the parameters of land claims agreements would be any different if
negotiations were starting today.
In contrast, some Aboriginal peoples see the retention of both
some level of influence over their traditional lands and their own
governance structures as crucial to their land claims. 220 The Gitxsan and
Wet'suwet'en Nations agreed to put their Delgamuukw appeal to the
Supreme Court of Canada on hold to enter into treaty negotiations.2 21
217 Many Nisga'a Nation members have reconciled the loss of a significant part of their
traditional lands with the advantages of having control over education and health care: see, for
example, the discussion of Caroline Daniel's viewpoint in "Nisga'a Grandmother Sees Great
Benefits" Victoria Times Colonist (4 October 1998) A6.
218 See "City Lawyer to File Appeal on Behalf of Kincolith Band" (Kelowna) Daily Courier (28
August 1998) A2.
219 Nisga'aAgreement, supra note 11, Preamble.

220 The Carrier-Sekani Tribal Council signed a framework agreement for a land claims
process in April 1997. One of their explicit goals is to retain their traditional system of selfgovernment (Bahl'ats), which is a structure of hereditary chiefs and family-based landholders.
Lynda Prince, Chief of the Carrier-Sekani Tribal Council, has stated that if the Nations accept a
municipal-style government like that advocated by the provincial and federal governments, it will
mean assimilation for her people: see M. Nielson, "Carrier-Sekani Want Self-Governmcnt Like
Nisga'a" Prince George Free Press (1 May 1997) A16.
221 The information about the Gitxsan Nation was taken from Sterritt et al., supra note 159;
and interview with R. Overstall, supra note 159. The federal government refused to negotiate with
the Gitxsan because of the outstanding Delgamuukv case: see "Feds Pull Out of Gitxsan
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For the Gitxsan, one of the main issues at the negotiating table is the
recognition of their House system of government, which the provincial

government refuses to acknowledge. 222 A treaty based on land selection
would result in some Gitxsan Houses retaining their economic and social
cohesion at the expense of other Houses whose land would be
relinquished in the settlement. The small size of the House groups,
coupled with regular opportunities for information exchange, creates a
strong social regulatory system. The social is the political. If a member of
one House compromises a House's resources, the family can be
mobilized to protect its interests. A unique characteristic of the Gitxsan
culture is that everyone has knowledge of, and access to, the traditional
law. The Gitxsan propose that Houses cooperate to manage forest
activities.22 3 Not every member of the Gitxsan Nation subscribes to the
traditional philosophy, of course, but most hold the view that if their own
system of social regulation is not permitted to co-exist with that of
western industrial society, then the Gitxsan will cease to exist as a
people.

Negotiations" Kahtou News (June 1995) 9; and British Columbia Treaty Commission, Report on the
Suspension of Gitksan Treaty Negotiations (Vancouver: British Columbia Treaty Commission, 1996)
8.
222 A House group is an extended family of 50 to 250 people who are biologically related.
There are more than fifty Gitxsan Houses, with House territories ranging from 200 to 185,000
hectares (average 29,000 hectares), which act as the primary political and landowning structure. The
system is one of horizontal regulation as there are no clan or high chiefs of all the Gitxsan, but
House or hereditary chiefs who voice the consensus of each House. The Gitxsan have been
clarifying the rights and territories of the Houses through the Feast system for thousands of years.
This method of governance is precise and well defined, and the Gitxsan communities continue to
recognize it as their political structure.
The Gitxsan interpret the Delgamuukvw decision as upholding their view that Aboriginal rights
are communal rights held by Houses that can be exercised by individuals. The provincial
government's position is that the communal right is held only by the Gitxsan as a whole. Therefore,
the province recognizes only the Gitxsan Nation, and not each House exercising historical House
rights. The province also takes the position that if the Gitxsan can conduct that activity elsewhere in
their traditional territory, then infringement of an Aboriginal right may be justified. However, if the
activity is moved to another House's territory, unacceptable injustices within the Gitxsan political
regime are created.
223 In the 1930s and 1940s, the Houses selectively horse-logged cedar trees for telephone and
power poles. The Gitxsan decided where to log, and then applied to the province for a licence. This
is the historical basis of cooperation between the provincial and Gitxsan system. A contemporary
management system would see House-by-House tenures. A variety of habitats would be maintained
to support the harvest of different forest resources required by the Gitxsan to exercise their
Aboriginal rights. Absent reforms to facilitate this kind of arrangement, the Gitxsan are moving
forward with exercising their Aboriginal rights on their land. The Gitxsan Strategic Watershed
Analysis Team is mapping an ecosystem-based plan for their traditional territory by combining
geographic information systems technology with the traditional ecological knowledge of Gitxsan
elders and community-led inventories: interview with R. Overstall, supra note 159.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 37 No. 4

While the modern treaty negotiation process could offer an
historical opportunity for First Nations to establish management control
over their lands, the narrow negotiating mandate actually adopted by the
provincial and federal governments impedes this development. Indeed,
it allows the erosion of Aboriginal title rights while negotiation is
underway. Instead of exploring the possibility of implementing
ecosystem-based management and/or structures that would allow for
communal management, the government is forcing First Nations to
relinquish their land base, accept status quo logging on it, and accept a
fundamental shift in community governance. This approach is not only
erosive of Aboriginal interests, but also wastes the unique historical
opportunity that treaty negotiations provide to begin to restructure
unsustainable non-Aboriginal uses of rural resources by creating a
strong, locally-based counterbalance to centralized industrial models.
Like the Gitxsan, some in the international community argue that
recognizing existing community rights and governance is most effective
for sustainable forest management:
Wherever local people are striving to protect and sustainably manage forests, the best
way to establish and secure these incentives is to get appropriate government agencies
and officials to recognize existing community-based rights .... 224
Functionally, community-based management systems and the property rights that they
establish and support draw their fundamental legitimacy from the community in which
they operate rather than from the nation-state in which they are located. ... Externally
initiated activities with varying degrees of community participation should not be referred
to as community-based, at least not until the community exercises primary decisionmaking authority.225

Abandoning the "land selection" model espoused by the federal
and provincial governments would expedite the settlement of treaties in
British Columbia by allowing First Nations to negotiate meaningfully on
the basis of their entire traditional area. This would also have the effect
of strengthening traditional forms of Aboriginal governance by leaving
existing systems in place. First Nations would not be required to
compromise traditional social and legal systems, thus facilitating the
implementation of traditional and new forms of forest management.
Such settlements could meet cultural as well as ecological goals, fulfil the
needs of diverse Aboriginal peoples, and help non-Aboriginal systems to
achieve necessary reforms for them as well. Such an approach would give
full effect to the Delgamuukw decision.

224 Lynch & Talbott, supra note 97 at 120.
225 Ibid. at 24-25.
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V. CONCLUSION: COMMUNITY
ECOSYSTEM-BASED MANAGEMENT
At the root of the resistance to adopting innovative
governmental and tenure systems is a simple, single fact: assertions of
Aboriginal title are a threat to, and opportunity for, the industrial
system. To date, none of the corporate tenures nor other management
vehicles used on traditional lands have provided First Nations with the
flexible tenures required to manage for many different forest values and
uses. 226 First Nations require tenures or land holding arrangements that
allow each community to detail how management should occur in their
traditional forests. These tenures cannot be constrained by volumebased production requirements and short-term timelines. Each
community needs the flexibility to plan according to the different
requirements and changing conditions of the ecosystems and
communities on traditional lands. 22 7 While such schemes would vary
from Nation to Nation, and would depend on how each First Nation
governs itself, they would allow Aboriginal peoples to manage for
diverse forest values. Finally, the development and ratification of an
Aboriginal Forest Policy that clearly sets out the framework within which
forestry will be practised in traditional areas, such as the NAFA
Guidelines,228 would provide each community with the tools to manage
for different forest uses, depending on local, ecological, and cultural
requirements.
It is at this point that the interests of First Nations, nonAboriginal communities, and the community forestry movement
intersect. 229 Only through such local control can traditional forms of

226 It is too early to determine if the joint venture and new tenure arrangement in Clayoquot
Sound will uphold ecosystem-based management and community concerns.
227 Both

NAFA

and the Royal Commission recommend that provinces amend their forestry

legislation to establish a special forest tenure category for holistic resource management by
Aboriginal communities in their traditional areas: see Restructuring the Relationship, supra note 5 at

638. One proposal that includes First Nations interests and follows a form of co-management is that
for a Community Forest Trust Act, whereby local communities would have jurisdiction and
stewardship of forests in their area: see Burda et aL, supranote 81.
228

Supra note 82.

229 As expressed in Restructuringthe Relationship,supra note 5 at 631-32:

As noted earlier, natural resource regulation regimes have historically favoured the
maximization of production, which is a major reason that Aboriginal peoples were
excluded from so many resource sectors. Even today, licensing systems continue to be
based on economies of scale, on the assumption that the largest producers (whether in

forestry, fisheries or other resource sectors) are the most efficient. But a new
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governance survive, and ecosystem-based management be implemented.
With the ultimate authority over the land base vested in the Crown in
question, only a fundamental transition, Whereby the state gives effect to
Aboriginal rights and the potential they have for constructive social
change, will allow for a meaningful transformation to occur towards the
sustainable governance of traditional lands by the communities who live
within them.

understanding of the concept of resource depletion, coupled with broad acceptance of
the principles of sustainable development, means that old assumptions about efficiency
may no longer be valid. The collapse of the Atlantic fishery is an excellent case in point.
Changing the system of resource allocation to benefit Aboriginal harvesters (as well as
other small producers in all regions of Canada) is not only a just solution, but also one
that can make long-term environmental and economic sense.

